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This study examines the trajectory of Rwanda’s statebuilding experience; the factors 
that underlined the conflict that invariably led to civil war and genocide in 1994; and 
the extent to which the resulting peace settlement addressed these factors. In this 
regard, it seeks to understand the nature of the conversations that occurred in the 
evolution of the state of Rwanda and what aspects of these conversations produced 
violent conflict and war and how much of this was taken into account in the peace 
settlement. The study therefore examines Rwanda’s civil war that lasted from 1990-
1994 and the genocide of 1994 from a historical perspective, tracing its root causes to 
the conversations surrounding the creation of the post-colonial state of Rwanda. It 
discusses settlement process to see the extent to which it deals with those root cause 
factors. The study relies largely on desk review of literature and documents as well as 
data from interviews with key informants and focus group discussions held in Rwanda. 
 
An examination of Rwanda over a period dating back from pre-colonial times until the 
1994 genocide reveals that Identity and reconstruction of “ideas of identity” are at the 
core of Rwanda’s nation- and state-building conversation. Those in conversation as well 
as the “conversable spaces” mutated across periods of Rwanda’s history, starting from 
the pre-colonial period to the post-genocide phase. Conversations about identity 
invariably underpinned other areas of Rwandan society and the emergent state, with 
certain identity forms and issues more dominant in the nation- and state-building 
conversations than others. The role of the military, and its place within state-society 
relations, has also been a consistently important theme in the story of Rwanda across 
the different time periods being discussed.  
 
In discussing these issues, this study focuses on the following questions: 
 What is Rwanda’s historical trajectory in relation to the statebuilding 
conversations that took place before the outbreak of violent conflict(s)? What 
were the root cause factors and triggers of violence? 
 What was distinctive about the process leading to the settlement? What are the 
distinct features of the settlement? 
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 What was the nature of the settlement and to what extent did it deal with the 
state-building conversations that led to violent conflict? Who were the leading 
actors? 
 What identity issues that were part of the state-building conversation were 
taken into consideration in the settlement and post settlement arrangements? 
 Has the gender regime that predated conflict altered? If so, how? Does this differ 

























PART I: Evolution of societal and state-building conversations in Rwanda 
Identity in Rwanda’s statebuilding conversation: pre-colonial origins 
In pre-colonial Rwanda, the terms Tutsi, Hutu and Twa represented socio-economic 
classes, affording people identities linked to their role and status in society. They were 
not the ethnic terms that would grow to dominate Rwandan life in the colonial and post-
colonial periods. The state of Rwanda as it exists today began its formation in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. A period of great drought and famines had 
decimated large swaths of populations in east-central Africa and triggered huge 
movements of people, leading to a re-structured ethno and political geography of the 
region.1 New socio-political institutions and kingdoms organized along clan structures 
began to emerge based on interactions between pastoralist and agriculturalists 
especially in the South. Especially in Rwanda and contrary to the Hamitic theories,2 at 
the core of this formation were clan identies, comprised of eighteen clans structured 
along the three main lineages – Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa members. These defined 
both the social status of an individual and exercise of political or religious duties.3  
 
This was a period of state expansion for Rwanda. The original meaning of the term 
‘Rwanda’ as interpreted by scholars means ‘drive for expansion’ which was reflected in 
the country’s quest for state expansion in the 14th to 19th centuries through warfare.4 
Particularly during the reign of Cyirima Rujugira in the last quarter of the 18th  century, 
Rwanda developed standing armies consisting mainly of Bahutu, Batutsi and foreigners 
(refugees from conquered kingdoms) to protect their territories and resources that 
were under threat.5 The armies were mainly organized and centralized within the hands 
of the dominant dynasties (the Nyinga dynasty for the Cyirima Rujugira case). Wars 
                                                 
1 Webster, J. Bertin, Bethwell Alan Ogot, and Jean-Pierre Chrétien. "The Great Lakes Region, 1500-1800." General 
History of Africa V: Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century. Ed. B.A Ogot. Carlifornia: UNESCO, Heineman. 
1992.  
2 The Hamitic theory – asserts that much of civilisation in Africa, including central Africa, is attributable to the 
superior race, Hamites who migrated from the East. See Mamdani, Mahmood. When Victims Become Killers: 
Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 79-87. 
According (Webster et al.,Op.Cit., p. 803) the theory influenced ethnologists especially the British and German 
travellers (popularly known as White Fathers), whose perspectives of communities in Rwanda was based on 
‘stereotyped aesthetic impressions and political considerations’. See Webster, et al. Op.Cit. 
3 Webster et al., Op.Cit., p.810  
4 Banchmann, Olaf. Quasi-Armies: Obstacles to, or Vehicle for, State-building in Central Africa, 2013, pp. 232-233.  
5 Webster et al. Op.Cit., pp.825-826. See also, Newbury, David. "Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda: local loyalties, 
regional royalties." The International Journal of African Historical Studies. 34.2. 2001, pp. 255-314. 
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were fought mainly for consolidation of the state, social coherence (by fighting non-
Rwandan neighbours), administration of justice and projection of state power.6      
 
In this period, elites - the King, his advisors and other noble men ‘chiefs’ and military 
commanders among others - managed societal conversations. The population was far 
less than contemporary times and therefore conflict centred on gaining land by 
expanding Rwanda, and less about settling individuals within Rwandan territory. 
Expansion was largely led by Kings in a successive cycle of four with each having a 
specific function.7 Soldiers were essential, regardless of their ‘ethnic’ or social group, 
and conquest wars with surrounding countries were led by individuals chosen by merit 
and acceptance in society.  Internal conflict mainly came from divergent views over who 
would control the newly conquered land. The King, who would judge and decide such 
matters, was ‘above’ social classifications (although coming from the Tutsi group, once 
becoming King they lost that label). This meant their legitimacy cut across clans and all 
social groups, so they were able to exercise authority on issues and at the same time 
mediate on conflict.8 It is important to realise that whenever conversations turned 
violent, the conflict did not tend to be among elites and the ordinary citizens, rather it 
was between an army from one Kingdom against another, and was centred around 
redefining borders of the central Kingdom that later became Rwanda.  We now know 
through proverbs and folk-tales that violence also occurred at a more localised and 
intra-family level (as happens within any society) but this was not necessarily caused by 
social, personal and ethnic differences. 
 
During this period the concept of identity was vague and changed its meaning 
depending on the ruler. Pre-colonial Rwandan society was organized around family, 
clans, and social class categories. Rwandans’ conversations of one’s identity, affiliation 
and belonging were more fixed on their clans than their Hutu/Tutsi and Twa identity, 
and Hutu/Tutsi/Twa could co-exist in one clan (ubwoko). The labels of Hutus, Tutsi and 
Twa were attached to what class a person belonged to and there were ample instances 
                                                 
6 Newbury, Op.Cit., Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda, pp. 300-301. 
7 The first King (King of peace) was in-charge of fostering the land. The second king’s role was aggression, that is 
spearheading the attack. The third King had the responsibility of defending the land from counter attack while the 
fourth King was meant to consolidate the gains. See Banchmann, Op. Cit., pp. 232.  
8 Interview with Prof. Ruzirabwoba Rwanyindo on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding pre and post-Genocide Rwanda, 
Kigali, recorded on 13/01/2016: 08:15 GMT.  
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of migration from one group to another through inter-marriage or a ruler’s decision. 
Newbury indicates that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa “were old terms, but their meanings and 
significance and the political significance of membership in them changed significantly 
over time.”9 Tutsi denoted those with wealth (10% of the society), Hutu those who 
worked for the wealthy Tutsi (86% of the population) and Twa (1%) despite being the 
first inhabitants of Rwanda are those at the lowest ebb of the social strata.10  
 
Pre-colonial Rwandan society was flexible as one could change from being Hutu and 
Twa to become Tutsi when one’s wealth increased. This change could happen if a Hutu 
or Twa acquired more than ten head of cattle, or if favoured by the King and given a 
Tutsi bride. The reverse was also true, as a Tutsi who lost cattle or lost favour with the 
King could become a Hutu or Twa.11 This change in status was called kwihutura literally 
meaning one has become a Tutsi. Conversely, the term Kwitutsura explains downward 
mobility; a term used when one lost cattle or married into and became part of a poor 
Hutu family. European ethnologists have previously described these terms as akin to a 
“caste” system, which implies a kind of “rigid hierarchy”. This was not the case. An in-
depth study of the clan structure has revealed that ethnic differentiation occurred along 
clan lines rather than along economic backgrounds (pastoralists or agriculturalists) as 
the Hamitic theories suggests.12 There was no religious ideology, or any economic 
occupation that distinguished Hutu and Tutsi. Both Hutus and Tutsis owned cattle, and 
tilled land as part of their economic activities including (as noted above) as part of the 
standing armies.13  
 
In this pre-colonial period women did not hold official political power. Yet the Queen 
Mother was extremely influential on matters of leadership and governance. She could 
contradict even top advisors, disrupt the political culture, and was in charge of tax 
collection (a very powerful role).14 The Queen Mother was a key actor whose actions 
                                                 
9 Newbury, Op.Cit.,Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda, p.10  
10 Ibid., p.11. These statistics were advanced by colonialists although these numbers can be disputed by the fact that 
in post-independence Rwanda there are many inter-marriages.  
11 It is important to note that this practice was not restricted to the pre-colonial period. Individuals in the post-
colonial period also could change their identity based on the prevailing socio-political climate at the time for example 
during data collection census exercises. See Fujii, Lee Ann. Killing neighbors: Webs of violence in Rwanda. Cornell 
University Press, 2011, pp.110-111.  
12 Webster et al. Op.Cit., p.812. 
13 Newbury, Op.Cit., Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda, p.12.  
14 A case in point is the Queen Mother Kanjogera who was from Abega clan who was known to be influential in 
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sometimes influenced the course of history in the country, and forced conversations on 
political issues and on Kingdom structures. These structures had micro decentralized 
levels of governance, which were again not centred on the Tutsi/Hutu/Twa distinctions. 
For example, the lowest ranks of administration - the hill chiefs - could be Tutsi, Hutu, or 
Twa.15  The triple hierarchy of chiefs - Umunyamutaka, umunyamukenke, umutware 
w’ingabo - system facilitated the channelling of information about traditional 
leadership, cultural practices and economic activities among various members across 
social strata. This system is outlined in detail in the box below. 
 
Triple hierarchy of chiefs: Umunyamutaka, 
umunyamukenke, umutware w’ingabo.16 
Social and political identity in pre-colonial Rwanda was 
organized through family, lineages, clans and a mixture of other 
complex factors that indicated social and political belonging. 
Institutional, governance, and administration issues illustrate 
how sophisticated the kingdom’s structured identities were. 
Among the king’s representatives, of particular importance 
were the chiefs who imposed taxes.17 The provincial chiefs 
were, above all, representatives of the royal authority (the king 
and his court attendants). They imposed and collected taxes in 
the provinces. Thus, royal residences, which were scattered in 
the entire kingdom, under King Kigeri Rwabugiri (ruling from 
1876) had a dual political and physical function. The royal 
                                                                                                                                                        
political leadership in 1896. Kanjogera plotted a coup d'état over King Rutalindwa. King Kigeli IV had appointed 
Rutalindwa before his son as his first child from another queen mother. However, Kanjogera wanted her son Musinga 
to rule. Kanjogera’s army won over that of Rutalindwa. They were all Tutsis but the two queen mothers were from 
different clans. Other queen mothers who followed were influential in political matters, owned land and cattle but not 
in such a visible role. Although Kanjogera’s actions could be considered as selfish they showed how important women 
were as actors in that society. See Newbury, Catharine. The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 
1860-1960. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, pp. 57-59; and Dorsey, Learthen. Historical Dictionary of 
Rwanda. Metuchen, N.J: Scarecrow Press, 1994, p. 345, both discuss the importance and role played by 
“Umugabekazi” or queen mother; Mbonimana, Gamaliel. "Christianisation indirecte et cristallisation des clivages 
Ethniques au Rwanda (1925-1931)." Enquêtes et documents d’histoire africaine.1978, p. 155-56. On the administrative 
roles of Women in general and Queen Mothers in particular, see Kamatali, Jean-Marie. "Rwanda: Balancing Gender 
Quotas and an Independent Judiciary." In Eds. Gretchen Bauer, and Josephine Dawuni Gender and the Judiciary in 
Africa: From obscurity to Parity. New York: Routledge 2016, pp. 138.  
15 Mamdani, pp.68-69.  
16 For the reign of the Kings see, Newbury, Op.Cit., Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda.  
17 Classe, L., “L’organisation politique du Ruanda”,  in Congo , 1992 ,p.685  
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tribute (ikoro) was taken to the royal residence and was taken 
care of by the king’s wife.18  
In the areas where the Ubuhake institution prevailed, the 
provincial administration was enforced by senior chiefs or in 
some cases by army commanders. Beyond provinces and 
marching camps (ingerero), power was exercised by three 
leaders whose existence was felt right from the rule of King 
Yuhi Gahindiro (ruling from 1801):19  
 Land and agriculture Chief (umutware 
w’umunyabutaka) 
 The Chief in charge of pastures (umutware 
w’umukenke, umunyamukenke) 
 War Chief (umutware w’ingabo) 
The King and the Queen Mother controlled these three types of Chiefs. 
There were a few exceptions to the divided functions of chiefs.  In 
Buhanga-Ndara, for instance, Chief Mbanzabugabo alias Bikotwa doubled 
as ‘umutware w’ubutaka’ and ‘umutware w’ingabo’. As for the Impala 
Province (Kinyanga-Cyangugu), it was Rwabirinda son of Mutara Rwogera 
who was ‘Umutware w’ubutaka’ and ‘Umutware w’umukenke’ in 1900.20 
Taxes were collected mainly by two types of civil servants (Ikoro); the chief 
of pastures (Umutware w’umukenke) who collected pastoral taxes and the 
land chief (Umutware w’ubutaka) who was charged with the collection of 
taxes on food items. This arrangement was modified by the sedentary 
nature of the Nyanza court under King Musinga (ruling from 1895). All 
                                                 
18 Testimony from Father Rubumbira, interviewed by Paul Rutayisire and Thomas Munyaneza, Nyagatare, recorded 
on 12/5/2004. 
19 Mbonimana,  G., “Les institutions traditionnelles constitutives de l’identité nationale”. In Cahiers du Centre de 
Gestion des Conflits, no 2, 2001, Mbonimana, G.,  The Kingdom of Rwanda from the beginning to 1900. In Eds. 
Byanafashe D. and Rutayisire, P., History of Rwanda. From the beginning to the end of the twentieth century, National 
university of Rwanda: Avenue de l’Université, Huye, 2011, p. 131.  
20 Rutayisire, P. and Munyaneza, T., “Rwanda under German and Belgian colonization (1896-1962).” In Byanafashe D. 
and Rutayisire, P., History of Rwanda. From the beginning to the end of the twentieth century. National university of 
Rwanda: Avenue de l’Université, Huye, 2011, p.205. 
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services were carried out in Nyanza but this was conceived as forced 
labour by people in peripheral regions.21   
 
Under the provincial level, there was another smaller division called 
Igikingi/ Ibikingi. Long ago, the Ibikingi were related to pastures. By 
extension, the word came to mean a command-base of one or more villages 
(collines in French). According to A. Kagame, there were two types of 
Ibikingi. There was the Igikingi that depended on the war chief (Umutware 
w’ingabo). It met the requirements of cow pastures. Villages (collines) were 
scattered. The royal court was not interested in having people with big 
pieces of land as this would threaten the power of central authority. There 
were also royal enclaves (Imisozi y’ibwami) for the personal servant of the 
king. This sub-division was unknown in regions where lineage 
organization was dominant. These included areas like Byumba, Gisenyi, 
Ruhengeri, Northern Kigali as well as some parts of Cyangugu. Here, land 
ownership depended on the first occupant and not on external political 
authority.  In the Northern part of Rwanda, the administration was 
generally enforced by lineage chiefs, clan chiefs and chiefs who were 
replaced by representatives, such as the representative of Nshozamihigo in 
Murera in the 1900’s. As far as clan entities in the North were concerned, 
the dominating clan chiefs were called the king’s chief (Abatware 
b’umwami). They reported directly to the court without passing through 
any intermediary. Most of these chiefs were Hutu who paid tribute to the 
king of Rwanda as a sign of allegiance22.   
 
What seems clear is that there was a system of taxation like other 
kingdoms or modern States. However, the tax system changed meaning 
when colonialists occupied Rwanda. This system also evolved to assume 
                                                 
21Testimony from Father Ngirabanyiginya, interviewed by Paul Rutayisire and Thomas Munyaneza, Nyundo, 
recorded on 10/6/2004. 
22 Anonyme (résidence du Rwanda), Historique et chronologie du Rwanda,  p.124 
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different social functions and definitions in society as the dynamics of 
power between groups also shifted meaning.23   
 
Colonial Rule: Evolution and use of identity (1897-1945) 
Colonial rule would change Rwanda from a society with a common identity comprising 
diverse social categories to a nation stratified along ethnic lines, religion and cultural 
categories.24 The colonial administration found an organized society with a court 
system and standing army that arguably resembled that of a modern state. Rwanda had 
been one of the few African states, or proto-state, to actively protect its population from 
the slave trade. While socio-cultural differences between regions and groups in pre-
colonial Rwanda cannot be denied, there also existed many factors of commonality such 
as language, religious practices, common habitat, clan network, wars against 
neighbouring kingdoms, a feeling of patriotism, etc. If the “premise of inequality” ever 
existed, it was linked to historic factors but not to static congenital criteria or even to 
the criterion of cow-ownership.25 
 
The Germans arrived in Ruanda and Urundi, as Rwanda and Burundi were known then, 
in 1897 as part of their exploration of East Africa. Belgium, being the closest colonial 
power in Congo, assumed the Ruanda-Urundi territories under a trusteeship granted by 
the League of Nations following Germany’s defeat in World War I. Belgium sustained 
their colonial project through a system of divide and rule. An accelerated shift took 
place on what kind of conversations were taking place on identity, how those 
conversations happened, where they happened, who managed them and how they 
affected all aspects of life for Rwandan society. The shifted conversations around 
identity ultimately reconfigured Rwandan society in to the stratified ethnic groupings 
that would eventual lead to genocide.  
                                                 
23 For more information about tax see, Mugemana,  M., Prestation et système fiscal de l’administration belge au 
Rwanda, 1921-1940, Mémoire de maitrise, 1983. 
24 Interview with Prof. Ruzirabwoba Rwanyindo 




Given the Kingdoms’ complex structure, the European (Belgian) colonialists resorted to 
dividing the society into different races and ethnic identities, giving preferential 
treatment of one category against another in order to control the land and its 
population. The Belgian authorities deliberately altered, through institutional policies, 
the complex and fluid identities and social structures existing in pre-colonial Rwanda 
that allowed an individual or family to change from their Hutu or Tutsi social status.26  It 
would appear that the Rwandan social fabric was completely destroyed by the Belgians 
who, using racial pseudo-scientific arguments that prevailed in nineteenth and 
twentieth century Europe and the United States. 
 
The Belgians associated physical traits to the Hutu and Tutsi social classifications, which 
established them as ethnic identities (ignoring the fact that these traits were due to the 
better living standards of the wealthier Tutsi).27 The perspectives on physical traits 
were rooted in Hamitic hypothesis where the Hutu and Tutsi were both ideologically 
and institutionally ‘racialized.’28  They chose to work with the ‘Tutsi’ King and his people 
to ease colonization. The Europeans appropriated themselves the role of educator and 
guide. The Belgian organisational formula involved two Residents together with a 
Resident General preparing a budget for the Minister of Colonies, for implementing 
programs on public works as well as controlling and supervising the native policy. The 
Resident General enjoyed direct relations with the Minister of Colonies, with the 
Governor General of Congo responsible for the two Residents. The Resident was 
responsible for territorial administration with help of territorial services which were 
divided into several departments: administration, public works, health, finance, and 
civil service). Crucially, all these departments were expected to enjoy “regular support of 
the Watusi” because of their “innate skills as far as taking commands” from the King was 
concerned.29 
 
                                                 
26 Mamdani, Op.Cit., pp. 87-102.  
27 Gasanabo, J. D. School history and mechanisms for the construction of exclusive identities: the case of Rwanda from 
1962 to 1994. In ed. Braslavsky C. Textbooks and Quality Learning for All: Some Lessons Learned from International 
Experiences. Paris: UNESCO, 2006. p.367  
28 Mamdani, Op. Cit., pp. 86-87.  
29 Rutayisire, P. and Munyaneza, T., Rwanda under German and Belgian colonization (1896-1962), Op.Cit., p.251.  
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The choice of using the Tutsi as partners was proposed and justified on the basis of 
racial arguments. Influenced by missionaries, the Belgians ascribed the royal class and 
aristocracy to the Tutsi by reproducing the Hamitic-stereotype. This was based on 
selected pseudo-scientific details of physical anthropological and ethnographical 
features of the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. This stereotype was reproduced in many official 
texts, thus establishing a cliché transmitted from one administrator to another. The 
Tutsi were seen as a noble class that originated from Asia and who had a long stopover 
in Pharaonic Egypt. All descriptions of Tutsi chiefs made reference to their slender 
features, tall height, diplomatic qualities and talent in military command. These 
qualities distinguished the Tutsi from their Hutu servants. The subordination of the 
latter originated from their moral character and especially the ownership of cows, from 
which the servant-master relationship emerged.30 The Minister of Colonies had this to 
say:  
 
 “(...) it was not a question of tampering with political institutions under the 
pretext of equality. We feel that the Watutsi were established since time 
immemorial, they are intelligent and are a capable people and we will 
respect this state of affairs (...)”.31.  
 
The Hutu were considered Bantu as opposed to the Nilotic Tutsi (historically incorrect 
but still repeated in current literature), and viewed as a section of defeated people.  
They did not share the qualities of their Tutsi masters, with their descriptions at the 
time akin to a classic picture of the Negro. The Twa, meanwhile, were devoid of any 
form of humanity. They did not have a good code of conduct and were cruel by nature. 
The annual report of the Nyanza Territory of 1925 described Twa in the following 
terms:   
 
“(...) an old and worn-out race facing extinction, the Mutwa (…) has a somatic 
character properly defined: short, broad-backed, muscular, hairy especially 
around the chest region, with an ape-like face and a distinct flat face and a 
                                                 
30 Rutayisire P., and Munyaneza T., Op,Cit., p. 255; For more explantations see , Rutembesa,  F., Les autorités indigènes 
dans la politique coloniale belge de 1916-1923, In Cahiers d’histoire de l’Université du Burundi, Avril, 1983 ; 
Rutembesa, F., La réorganisation administrative et ses conséquences au Rwanda entre 1926 et 1931, In Cahiers 
d’Histoire, 2, 1984. 
31 Franck L., Le Congo belge t.1, La renaissance du livre Bruxelles, 1931. 
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flat nose that combines the general physical traits of the monkey with 
obsession for forests (...) .”  
 
Missionaries and the colonial state established schools in Nyanza, where the King 
resided, circa 1919 and this effect cemented ethnic stratification. The main purpose of 
this education at this time was two-fold: first to train catechists to spread Catholicism to 
the local population; and second to train auxiliaries to assist the Colonial Masters for 
local administration, agricultural production of cash crops for export and enforcement 
of labour (labour forced on peasants resulted in the first exodus of the Rwandans into 
neighbouring Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya in the 1930s and 1940s.) The import of 
formal education within Rwanda began the ethnic stratification of Rwandan society. 
Access to schooling was reserved and accessed mostly by the privileged sons of the 
Tutsi leaders favoured by the Belgians. Access to education meant access to leadership 
positions, power and resources. At a new school in Butare set up in 1929, for example, 
different subjects were taught including agriculture, economics, management and 
administration. Administration, however, was only ever taught to the sons of current 
leaders. Colonial schools were therefore sites of conversation that reinforced the 
racialized identities brought and imposed by the Belgian authorities, with access to 
education reinforcing these new societal divisions. Outside of those spaces, they also 
began fuelling resentment amongst marginalized groups, namely Hutu as well as poorer 
less-privileged Tutsi (along with the Twa).32  
 
Even though myths about Tutsi identity were widespread and widely accepted, 
education was not afforded to all Tutsis. Education was given to the few who were 
regarded as nobles and to whom the European administration would entrust power.33 
Preference was given to men over women. Nuns or wives of male missionaries taught 
women on how to sew and make beautiful artefacts that were of European standard. 
This was despite pre-colonial Rwanda having a strong culture of art, which had been 
produced by both men and women. In this setting, the Rwandan society was redefined 
even in terms of profession. The gendered lenses of Europeans suggested to Rwandan 
                                                 
32 Interview with Prof. Ruzirabwoba Rwanyindo on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding pre and post-Genocide Rwanda, 
Kigali, recorded on 13/01/2016: 08:15 GMT 
33 The schools established by the Belgian authorities were mainly to serve interests of the missionaries and 
colonizers rather than the people. See, Walker-Kelleher, Jessica. "Reconceptualizing the relationship between conflict 
and education: The case of Rwanda." Praxis, The Fletcher Journal of Human Security . 21. 2006, p. 37   
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society that females were not capable of understanding the kind of learning that was 
taking place in a classroom. 
 
The missionaries who came to Rwanda had sought to work hand in hand with the ‘Tutsi’ 
King due to the influence and respect it had across Rwanda. This had been the first 
instance of privileging one group over another,34 with the religious-colonial linkages 
culminating in the 1931 forced deposition of King Musinga when he refused to give up 
his divinity and convert to Christianity (he was replaced by his son, who had been 
educated by missionaries).35 The Catholic Church ascribed meaning to the identities. 
Priests, Nuns, Bishops went beyond preaching and interpreting the identity difference, 
to offering a moral position of what actions should be taken as a result of being Hutu or 
Tutsi.  French missionary Mgr Classe, for example (an early missionary sent to Rwanda 
in 1900) in 1927 addressed a letter to Mr. Mortehan, the Resident of Rwanda, defending 
and praising the Tutsi for their role in protecting colonial interests. He said:  
 
“(...) the Batutsi authority (...) is opposed to that of Musinga (...): currently, if 
we want to sound practical in the interests of the country with the Tutsi 
youth, we have achieved incomparable progress, and that even all those who 
know Rwanda can recognize this fact (…)  the youth have come closer to the 
Europeans and they fear nothing (except) the return of the former regime 
(...), the senior and junior chiefs who have lost their posts (...) are very 
many”.36   
 
This was in spite of an earlier 1922 letter where Mgr. Classe explained:  “(...) all the 
Rwandan population is intelligent. And, contrary to the general ideas held, I would like 
to say that the Batutsi are generally not more intelligent than the Bahutu (…).”37 This is 
indicative that missionaries and colonialists were not entirely ignorant as to the lack of 
genuine racial difference between groups in Rwanda; but that they saw their colonial 
model best enforced through the elevation of Tutsi collaborators.  
 
                                                 
34 Interview with Excellence Mgr. Servilien Nzakamwita, Kigali, 13-01-2016 : 11:00 GMT 
35 Bachmann, Op.Cit., Quasi-Armies, p.238.  




Thus the conversable spaces of the pre-colonial period in which social mobility and 
military expansion could be achieved in part on meritorious bases changed drastically 
with colonial rule. The new external actors in this space fundamentally altered the 
identity conversation, the spaces where they occurred and the forms in which they 
occurred in the Rwandan society.  
Restructuring Society: leaders, tax and land  
Key to the colonial restructuring of Rwandan society was the radical altering of the 
complex indigenous system of chiefs. In 1924 the Belgians sought initially to depose 
chiefs who, according to the authorities, ‘demonstrated a retrogressive character and 
who refused to abandon their arbitrary procedures of administration.’38 This effort to 
replace all “dead wood” with educated people39 was institutionalised with the 1926 
‘Mortehan reform’, which ended the traditional three-chief system and created a 
structure of chieftaincy and a sub-chieftaincy. The reforms sought to manage the 
territory more efficiently, due to the difficulty in Rwanda’s many authorities at the same 
time. In 1930 the Resident abolished the smaller Ibikingi divisions and those who were 
benefiting from them.40 One thousand two hundred and seventy-eight (1,278) sub-
chiefs as well as owners of Ibikingi were removed.41 The colonial administration 
employed a policy of combining chieftaincies to include neighbouring territorial sub-
divisions, which empowered the provincial chiefs.42 In some areas, the initiative of 
exchanging territories was left to the notables themselves. In other cases, a massive 
removal of chiefs took place from 1930 to 1932, which brought several territories 
together.43 Many Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs were removed as a result.44  
 
                                                 
38 Ministère des colonies, Rapport annuel sur l’administration belge, 1924, p.7. 
39 Ministère des colonies, Rapport annuel sur l’administration belge, 1925, p.64. 
40 The Igikingi consisted of a hill or part of the hill covered by some homesteads. 
41 Ministère des colonies, Rapport annuel sur l’administration belge, 1926, p.67 In Rutayisire P., and Munyaneza, T., 
Op.Cit., p. 264.  
42 Ministère des colonies, Rapport annuel sur l’administration belge, 1927, p. 37. 
43 10 chiefs and 316 sub-chiefs were dismissed on top of King Musinga, in other words more than half of those who 
existed before the re-organization. 
44 Rutayisire, P. and Munyaneza, T., Rwanda under German and Belgian colonization (1896-1962) in Byanafashe D. 
and Rutayisire, P., Op.Cit., 265. It is worth mentioning two examples of Hutu sub-chiefs who were dismissed: 
Nkunzuwimye a sub-chief in Rwabutogo Chieftaincy in Gatsibu Territory. He is presented as follows: “a sub-chief who 
was least impressive from the prestigious point of view. He was a Muhutu who had to be supervised. in all he asked 
his subordinates to do” (General Report of Gatsibu 1929, p.24 Derscheid papers). Another sub-chief was from Mutara 
in Gabiro Territory: “Muhuku was not a bad sub-chief. But he was a Muhutu who was supposed to be supervised in all 
his actions. He has to feel that he is supervised. This was the same for all the Bahutu who were in key positions” 
(General report of Gabiro 1929, p.29 Derscheid papers).  See also Ministere des Colonies, Rapport annuel sur 
l’administration belge au Ruanda-Urundi, 1929. 
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The removal of many lines of command and the decision that chiefs should stay in their 
chieftaincies (as opposed to the temporary arrangements that prevailed previously) 
helped achieve the colonialists’ goals of a more efficient administrative system, from the 
Belgian perspective. The re-organization was completed at the end of 1933, by which 
time there were 65 provincial chiefs exercising authority over an average of 5,500 tax 
payers and 1,043 sub-chiefs under whose jurisdiction was an average of 343 tax payers. 
The divisional groupings then continued but at a lower rate. At the time of 
independence in 1959 there were 55 chiefs and 559 sub-chiefs.45 
 
Of particular note and importance, removal of the Ubuhake three-chief system meant 
the removal of the War Chief role. Scholars argue that elimination of the army chief not 
only ‘destroyed the pre-existing balance of forces’ but prepared grounds for an 
authoritarian system centred on the rule of a single and virtually omnipotent chief.46 
Rwanda’s military, the protector of pre-colonial society and expander of its territory, 
became more fused with the interest of the elite rulers and thus more a tool for control 
and subjugation, if required. The Belgians ultimately sought to replace the King’s 
authority with that of their Chiefs, who were selectively appointed by colonial 
administrators mainly from the Tutsi. This meant, therefore, that conversations over 
land contestations – which had been an issue in pre-colonial times - were now mainly 
determined by elites who had access to education and power.47 
 
The pre-colonial tax system was inevitably altered due to this desired restructuring. 
This further impacted on land issues that were to become an increasingly prominent 
issue for Rwanda and the relationship between Hutu-Tutsi identities. The territorial 
reorganization and simplification of the hierarchy led to the problem of existing 
Ubuhake contracts. Under Rwanda’s original three-Chief system a person could become 
a client of a notable but also a subject of another. The notables were always convened 
and forced to exchange political commands and servants.48 Political and 
administratively, the Belgian authorities undermined this system and restricted its 
                                                 
45 Rutayisire P., and Munyaneza, T., Op.Cit., p. 263-265.  
46 Lemarchand, René. Rwanda and Burundi. Praeger Publishers, 1970, p. 73. 
47 Interview with Prof. Ruzirabwoba Rwanyindo. 
48 Rutayisire P., and Munyaneza, T., Op.Cit., p. 264. See critical perspectives on Ubuhake contract in Mamdani, Op.Cit., 
pp. 64-66; Nkulikiyimfura J.N., Le gros bétail et la société rwandaise. Evolution historique des XIIe-XIVe siècles à 
1958, Paris, Le Harmattan, 1994, p.228 ; Prunier, G., The Rwanda Crisis. History of a Genocide, London, Hurst& 
Company, 2002, pp.29-33.  
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scope. They abolished “imponoke cows”, for example, the cows given to the master by 
the client to replace the king’s cattle, which were hit by disease. Likewise, 
“indabukirano” was abolished, the cows given by lineages to chiefs or deputy-chiefs 
after their appointment.49 And chiefs or deputy-chiefs were no longer allowed to 
become servants or clients of two masters at the same time.50  
 
These moves were clearly problematic. A 1936 report by the Ruanda-Urundi 
administrative authorities noted serious absenteeism by servants who were supposed 
to fulfil their duties according to the new colonial arrangement.51 Conflicts between 
servants and masters became commonplace. From July 1939, in order to reduce the 
master-servant conflicts as well as to provide reference documents to facilitate the 
mitigation and settlement of disputes, the colonial administration and the King codified 
customs and practices on Ubuhake, which were enforced from January 1942.52 The 
problem of pastures remained unsolved, however, and the Ubuhake tax system lingered 
after independence. In 1934, Rwanda had 1,572,527 inhabitants, 624,102 heads of 
cattle and 1,263,400 hectares of virgin grazing land, meaning each cattle had 
approximately 2 hectares of grazing land. In 1955, Rwanda had 2,309,499 inhabitants, 
579,831 heads of cattle and grazing land of 875,619 hectares, allowing 1.6 hectares per 
cattle.53 The Ubuhake tax system was increased from the 1950s despite the colonialists’ 
efforts and the view amongst Rwanda’s emerging leaders that the system was 
backward.54 Grégoire Kayibanda, the future first President of Rwanda, made the 
following comments on the Ubuhake institution after the inauguration of the first 
session of the Higher National Council (CSP) in 1954:  
 
(...) it seems that the problem is hard to solve [...] destroying not only the 
practice and spirit of Ubuhake as soon as possible. The feudal mentality was 
in fact built on falsehood, the art of sowing discord, unrealistic policies in 
order to favour X and Y and kill a rival, consequently, causing mistrust, 
                                                 
49 Service order 2213/ Order of September 26th, 1924. 
50 Bourgeois R., 1954, Op.Cit., p.24. 
51 Ministère des Colonies, Rapport annuel de l’administration belge. 1936, pp. 65-66. 
52 Rutayisire, P. and Munyaneza, T., G., Op.Cit.,  p.302. 
53 Rutayisire, P. and Munyaneza, T., G., Rwanda under German and Belgian colonization (1896-1962) , Op.Cit., p.305. 
54 Mamdani, Op.Cit, p. 65. Mamdani argues that ubuhake exposed the clients to more arbitrary form of exploitation” , 
including possible confiscation of any personal cattle at the pleasure of the patron.  
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hatred and other faults of this nature. This is the canker, which is most 
opposed to the assimilation of Western contribution.55 
 
The new political re-organization of Rwanda led to the monopoly of power by the Tutsi. 
It reinforced ethnic identity through the extension of Tutsi authority and aristocracy to 
regions where it had never been recognized previously. Introduced in 1931, identity 
cards helped facilitate and fully institutionalise the stratification by ascribing ethnic 
identity, which thus determined who was allowed into schools and better paying 
professions. The identity cards were a critical piece of paper, (and would become ever 
more so post-independence) that the relevant identity was sometimes purchased, to 
allow access to opportunity. This all created a systematised privileging of certain 
groups, through nomination of certain leaders who did not necessarily have traditional 
authority. A strong focus on hereditary privilege retained power within that favoured 
group.56   
Re-learning identity and reversal of power dynamics (1946-1962)  
The period of 1950’s to 1990s saw the indoctrination of the youth and old alike in 
shaping their conceptualization of identity, both of the self and of the “other” to be 
regarded as an enemy. Rwandan ideas of identity were re-learned and the “conversable” 
spaces produced dominant ideas of identity in ways that led to violent conflict. 
Developments in Rwanda were invariably shaped by events within and outside the 
country as the identity conversations attained new meanings and ultimately 
restructured the socio-political order in ways that laid the path for war. The period, 
which began in 1946, was characterized by several events, which unfolded one after the 
other. The significance of this period is the fact that it was during this period that the 
Hutu and Tutsi elites began expressing their opinions officially in different channels such 
as the circles and associations of “évolués”, journals, official documents, tracts, 
movements and political parties.57 Furthermore, this period saw the beginning of Hutu 
consciousness of their actual misery and potential power.58  
                                                 
55 L’ami, no 112, April, 1954, p. 129. 
56 Interview with Prof. Ruzirabwoba Rwanyindo on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding pre and post-Genocide Rwanda, 
Kigali, recorded on 13/01/2016: 08:15 GMT. 
57 Reference is made to the leaders of the  circles and associations of “évolués”  (The Bigirumwami circle Nyundo- 
Gisenyi,  Association of Former Astridians (ASSADA, Association of Former Seminarians, Rwanda Teachers 
Association, (AMR), Association des Moniteurs du Rwanda). Their writings were published by the Roman Catholic 




After the Second World War, Rwanda was placed under a Trusteeship by the newly 
formed United Nations. Effective from 13th December 1946 the Trusteeship accord 
envisaged a specified period at the end of which the territory would become an 
independent and sovereign state. The espoused mission for protecting the country was 
now the following:  
 
“(...) the authority charged with the administration will encourage the 
promotion of indigenous institutions which correspond to the interest of 
Ruanda-Urundi. To this effect, the Trusteeship Authority will give a chance to 
the inhabitants of Ruanda-Urundi to participate increasingly in the 
administration and providing local and central services in the territory, to 
promote the participation of inhabitants in a representative democracy 
among the population in appropriate conditions and specific circumstances, 
to take all measures possible to ensure political evolution of the population 
of Ruanda-Urundi.”59  
 
In practice, Rwanda effectively remained under Belgian rule with its people subject to 
the colonial masters. But structurally the Trusteeship did bring changes regarding the 
implementation of its resolutions, so that visiting teams monitored the progress being 
made towards allowing indigenous people to express themselves. Members of the 
Trusteeship Council visited Rwanda five times between 1948 and 1962 in order to push 
for the creation of democracy and the provision of political education for the 
population. Belgian working procedures were criticised by the visiting teams, who saw 
certain measures as delaying the country’s development. Conversations around fighting 
                                                                                                                                                        
two newspapers whose chief editors were members of the Seminary Alumni. These were: Aloys Munyangaju, Chief 
Editor of “Temps Nouveaux d’Afrique”. in Usumbura and Grégoire Kayibanda who was the Chief Editor of 
“Kinyamateka” at Kabgayi for some time. Source: Anonymous, “Cercles et associations des évolués du Congo Belge et 
du Ruanda-Urundi, in Temps Nouveaux d’Afrique, 15 janvier 1956, pp. 3-4 ; Kagame, A., “Evolué du Rwanda et les 
ancêtres. In La voix du Congolais, no 7, janvier-février 1946, p. 250, in Ndikumana, I., Les évolués et l’évolution socio-
politique au Rwanda ( 1945-1959), Mémoire présenté et défendu publiquement en vue de l’obtention du grade de 
Licence en Histoire, 1998, Université Nationale du Rwanda Faculté des Lettres, Butare, septembre, 1998,  p. 32. 
58 Bhattacharyya J., , Belgian Administration in Rwanda during the Trusteeship period with special reference to the 
Tutsi- Hutu Relationship. Thesis. University of Delhi, 1967, p. 135. 
59 The United Nations Organization, UNO Trusteeship Council report of the UNO visiting mission to Rwanda-Urundi, 
1948, New York, pp. 9-10. 
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for autonomy, changing the restrictive education system, and installing democracy now 
began to appear more strongly.60 
 
The nationalistic politics, which swept across Africa in the 1950s, was not missed in 
Rwanda. The privileged individuals, who were educated, meaning the Tutsi, were vocal 
about their nationalist agenda. In fact, the Hutu elite tended to favour the continuation 
of Belgian presence, at least in the short term, to allow them time to develop their 
power base in order to perhaps enjoy eventual independence on a more equal basis 
with the Tutsi. As the Tutsi began vocalizing the cause of Rwandan independence, the 
Belgian colonists (who resented such moves), chose to pass authority to the 
underprivileged Hutu. They even began creating civil society groups and selecting 
leaders from the few neglected Hutu who had actually been educated, and encouraged 
their belief of having been subjugated by the privileged ruling Tutsi group.61  
 
These changes were not sufficient to satisfy growing demands among the Hutu for 
participation in the political system, but they were great enough to cause a reaction 
among conservative Tutsi elites who became increasingly determined to hold on to 
‘power’.62 The calls for independence saw Belgium broaden the internal political power 
structure and authorise the creation of political parties in 1959.63 Groups of Hutu 
organized ‘themselves’ politically, with the support of the Belgian administration and 
Catholic Church, to overthrow the monarchy. The killing of some Tutsi’ supporters 
began to occur.64  
 
The 1959 authorisation saw a total of 20 political parties appear in Rwanda. Most 
remained region parties or associations, however, with only four being major national 
movements. The Aprosoma (Association for the promotion of the social masses) was 
mostly based in the south of the country, and is seen as the starting point for the “Hutu 
                                                 
60 This is the summary of the ideas discussed during the Focus group interviews conducted and recorded by Paul 
Rutayisire, Deo Byanafashe, Kabwete Murinda and Thomas Munyaneza on the History of Catholic church in Rwanda. 
The study was financed and supervised by National Museum of Rwanda between 2009 and 2010. The recorded 
interviews are gathered at NMR, Huye, Rwanda.   
61 Interview with Prof. Ruzirabwoba Rwanyindo on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding pre and post-Genocide Rwanda, 
Kigali, recorded on 13/01/2016: 08:15 GMT.  
62 Interview with Father Rubumbira, Nyagatare; Chretien,  J.P., and  Kabanda, M., Rwanda. Racisme et Génocide. 
L’idéologie hamitique, Edition Berlin, 2013, pp.108-113. 
63 The political Parties were created on the basis of the Legislative order No. 11/234 of 8th May 1959 approved by the 
Ordinance R.U. No 111/105 of 15th June 1959 
64 Ibidem. See also Saur, L., Influence parelleles. L’Internationale démocrate chrétienne au Rwanda, Bruxelles, Luc 
Pire, 1998.. Nsengimana J., Le Rwanda est-il une nation ?, Dialogue, Kigali, Janvier 1993, pp.39-52.   
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Power movement.” Aprosoma expressed its ideology through a journal entitled: “Ijwi rya 
Rubanda rugufi” (the voice of the lower class) printed into Kinyarwanda language. In 
their program Aprosoma claimed that: “Rwanda shall no longer be a colony of the Tutsis.  
They should not reduce the native Hutu to slavery.”65 Parmehutu (Movement of the Hutu 
Masses) claimed that independence would be achieved only after the colonization of 
‘blacks by blacks,’ meaning the colonisation of Tutsi by the majority Hutu.66 It shared a 
Hutu-power ideology with Aprosoma, but was distinguished by its northern as opposed 
to southern power base, and the support it received by the Catholic Church.67  
 
The UNAR (National Rwandese Union) had a Hutu President (François Rukeba) but 
declared themselves as enemies of sectarianism and wanted to recruit all Rwandans 
regardless of their race, social status and religion.68 UNAR's political aim was the 
gaining of autonomy in 1960 and independence in 1962, and establishing a democracy 
and constitutional monarchy.69 The mysterious death of King Mutara III Rudahigwa on 
25th July 1959 made the work of this apparently inclusive party more difficult. However, 
it signalled a break between the colonial administration and the Tutsi authorities, and 
led to an increase in fear and aggressiveness amidst rumours of foul play in the death. 
Finally, the RADER (Rassemblement Démocratique Rwandais) was a small party 
supposedly comprising progressive elements. It was, however, actually a creation of the 
Belgian authorities who were opposed to UNAR and wanted to divide the Batutsi 
monarchists.70  
 
The racialized understanding of the Hutu-Tutsi divide had taken root, and achievement 
of power was seen through a lens requiring victory of one group over the other. And 
                                                 
65 Murego, D., 1975, Op.Cit. p. 897; these were the main themes found in the newspaper called Ijwi rya Rubanda rugufi 
(the voice of the voiceless), developed by Habyarimana. See for example "Manifeste-Programme du parti Uhuru", in 
Nkundabagenzi (éd.), Rwanda politique, pp. 258-261. 
66See "Manifeste-Programme du Parmehutu" in Nkundabagenzi (éd.), Rwanda politique, pp. 113-121. Appel 
pathétique du Rwanda (Rwanda’s pathetic appeal), May 8th 1960: it was signed by six leaders of the party, including 
Kayibanda. 
67 G. Kayibanda had ties with many associations which had good working relations with the Catholic Church and 
throughout the country. For instance mutual assistance groups, Legio Mariae, association of teachers and seminary 
alumni, associations of former pupils, cultural circles, cooperatives, Sacred heart leagues,  teachers’ or pupils’ choirs, 
Eucharistic crusades among others. 
68 Nkundabagenzi, F, 1962, Op.Cit. pp. 99. 101. 
69 See ‘Charte de fondation du Parti 'Unar’ (réunion du 15 août 1959), and "Manifeste du Parti politique 
'Abashyirahamwe b'u Rwanda (Union Nationale Ruandaise) in Nkundabagenzi (éd.), Rwanda politique, pp. 93-101. 
Maquet, Jacques, J. "La participation de la classe paysanne au mouvement d'indépendance du Rwanda", Cahiers 
d'Etudes Africaines, Vol. 4, No. 16, 1964, pp. 552-568. 
70 Kagame, Evolué du Rwanda et les ancêtres, Op.Cit., pp. 265-266; Logiest, G., « Mission au Rwanda. Un Blanc dans la 
bagarre Tutsi-Hutu », Bruxelles, Didier-Hatier, 1988, p. 101. 
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having never truly forcefully demanded independence, instead being part of the broader 
trend occurring across Africa, the colonial powers in Rwanda were particularly well 
placed to grant independence in a fashion that maintained their presence in key 
positions.71 The trend was towards fear, accusations and cleavage; and the 
institutionalization of violence. European administrators and the Hutu elite argued that 
the Hutu majority should lead independent Rwanda. The tensions around the death of 
King Mutara III Rudahigwa rapidly escalated into violence. Hutu started decimating 
Tutsi who began fleeing the country. The Belgians replaced the Tutsi administrators 
with members of the Hutu population. In 1960 Gregoire Kayibanda headed the 
provincial government. Kayibanda was a Hutu and former private secretary of the 
Archbishop of Rwanda Monsingnor Perraudin, who had fully supported and possibly 
shaped Kayibanda’s political thought.72 The monarchy was abolished in 1961 and on 1st 
July 1962 Rwanda was granted full independence.73  
 
Thus colonial rule had achieved a wholesale reversal of the social and political order 
that underpinned the stability of Rwandan society (with its statist logic) in pre-colonial 
times while also transforming the nature of the conversations that occurred in that 
society and the conversable spaces. A series of consistent internally generated 
conversations about identity and society – with an inbuilt logic of mobility and 
flexibility – were invariably transformed into violent conversations with different ideas 
of identity and governance. The conversable spaces shifted from internally oriented 
ones to externally referenced ones.   
 
The First and Second Republics: the consolidation of identity (1962-1975; 1975-
1990)   
This political change presented a new opportunity for Rwandans to re-imagine and re-
orient ideas on ethnic identities. Instead the influence of Belgian priests and 
administrators remained, via both their colonial legacy and continued presence in 
Rwanda. A social revolution in Belgium had recently put the majority Walloon in power 
                                                 
71 Interview with Prof. Ruzirabwoba Rwanyindo on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding pre and post-Genocide Rwanda, 
Kigali, 13/01/2016: 08:15 GMT.  
72 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 118.  
73 Gellately, Robert, and Ben Kiernan. The specter of genocide: Mass murder in historical perspective. Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, p.330. 
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over the Flemish minority. And in Rwanda the former colonial administrators and 
priests were replaced. The new administrators favoured “majority rule,” which in effect 
meant Hutu power. The first Republic of Kayibanda (1962-1973) produced identity 
knowledge that encouraged division and hatred against the Tutsis. The Tutsi who had 
survived the massacres or not fled in 1959 would now be denied social mobility 
opportunities such as access to schools.74 President Kayibanda and the Hutu-elite he 
brought in to decision-making positions determined what kinds of conversations 
occurred in the public realm, and the place of Tutsis and Twas in that conversation. The 
ethnic identities created by the Belgians were now fixed into independent Rwanda’s 
politics, culture and psyche; but with an acrid twist whereby the majority interests of 
the hard-working deserving Hutu superseded the minority Tutsi. Tutsi were no longer 
the superior, intelligent, justified natural rulers of Rwanda but instead seen as sneaky, 
untrustworthy, power-hungry subjugators.   
The role of education in learning identity 
Just like in the colonial era, post-1962 education created an important space for both 
learning and reinforcing identity differences between groups. Educational opportunities 
certainly expanded. Primary schooling was declared free and obligatory, and enrolment 
increased from 250,000 to 386,000 pupils between 1962 and 1975. Secondary 
education expanded over the same period, with 64 schools and a student population of 
11,227 students. And the National University of Rwanda opened in 1963 with six 
faculties (medicine, agriculture, law, social sciences, natural sciences and arts) and an 
enrolment of 619 students. Yet in practice this educational expansion was not available 
for all Rwandans. The education system remained discriminatory after independence, 
this time in favour of the Hutu and against the Tutsi and Twa. Quotas admitted students 
not only on merit but ethnicity, which negatively affected many Tutsi children.  
 
School textbooks at the time were written to portray Tutsis as “rich, foreign and 
oppressors.”75 Textbooks presented the Tutsi as foreigners from Ethiopia, as 
hypothesized by colonialists. Such stereotypes were also perpetuated outside of the 
classrooms meaning children from a young age were indoctrinated with ideologies of 
                                                 
74 Mugesera A., Imibereho y’Abatutsi kuri Republika ya mbere n’iya kabili, ( 1959-1990), Kigali, Editions Rwandaise, 
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divisionism and hatred towards the Tutsis. The new republic inverted the colonial 
system, with Tutsi (and of course Twa) now marginalized through both the racist 
ideologies taught in schools and their limited ability to participate in the education 
system. In the 1980s and 1990s, this mistreatment extended to those who were of 
mixed ethnicities in particular those from the southern part of Rwanda. These were 
popularly referred to as Abanyendunga, distinguished from "true" Hutu who were 
called Abacyiga.  
 
The teaching of identity through the education sector was successful in educating 
Rwandans about the meaning of their identity and how to practice their ethnic 
belonging to a community. Using the learned race theories and Hamitic myths, the 
Rwandan population had been clearly divided; even those with mixed ethnicities were 
forced to identify with one group or the other. In the majority of schools in pre-1994 
Rwanda the hidden (and not so hidden) curricula were designed to segregate and 
alienate ethnic minorities, ensuring cultural reproduction and safeguarding of the 
dominant position of a certain group.76 This would become ever more explicit and 
pronounced in the later lead up to the genocide, with Tutsi being labelled terms like 
snake and cockroach. 
Regional identity 
A new identity classification also began to emerge, with the question of regionalism 
surfacing. The Abanyenduga (those from the South where the President Kayibanda 
originated) and Abacyiga (the Northerners) started new conversations of belonging, 
with associated access to economic and social mobility. The first Republic perceived the 
Northerners as good military men. They were important ‘partners’ because of their hard 
working culture, fertile land that could provide food for other regions, and their 
straightforwardness on expressing disagreements or opinions on social issues. Such 
conversations not only developed these regional stereotypes, but were also reflected in 
national political leadership, societal organization (such as marriage etc.) and 
economic.77  
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The Second Republic of Habyarimana, emerged out of these conversations and 
stereotypes of what regional identity meant. The Kayibanda regime ended in 1973 
through a coup d’Etat by his chief of staff and head of the army Habyarimana Juvenal. 
The coup d’Etat confirmed and consolidated the military’s role in state-society relations 
in the post-colonial era, with the army now overtly centralised as the force to maintain 
incumbency (rather than as protector and unifier of the people). Social imbalances 
would not be tackled by the new regime.78 Habyarimana’s Northerners identified 
themselves as Hutus and proud to have little mixed families. They regarded Southerners 
as weak, Tutsi lovers and lazy. Although there were stereotypes for communities from 
other regions, the Southern and Northern identities were the most visible in these 
conversations. Habyarimana’s one candidate single party (MRND) model meant he 
consolidated political power through a culture of fear around elections (where he 
consistently received very nearly 100% of the votes).   Habyarimana did put a few 
Tutsis in power for representation purposes, but also created a small house - known as 
Akazu - of advisors from his hometown sub-region of the North West. These were the 
managers of mainstream conversations allowed in public on identity, politics, economic 
development, military, law, parliament, society, art and religion. These Hutu elites 
practiced a Hutu identity, which afforded them power and wealth. As leaders they 
dominated every sphere of Rwandan society.  
 
Until the late 1980s the state was a strong institution controlled by a Hutu elite largely 
from the North of Abakiga, the home of Habyarimana. The state offered the best access 
to upward social, political and economic mobility.  It not only controlled access to 
education, but also dominated the employment market in a country were over 90% of 
employment was agriculture based. According to Peter Uvin “the state effectively was in 
charge of all fields of human endeavour and all sectors of the economy.”79 The majority 
of the pupils receiving education in the year 1980s were predominantly Hutus, and 
when foreign scholarships were distributed according to regions they afforded more 
opportunities to those in the North, in Hutu dominated areas such as Gisenyi, Ruhengeri 
and to some extent Byumba.  
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Ethnic identity remained key, but regional identity continued to be important and was 
associated with the learned racial distinctions. Foreign educational scholarships, for 
example, were distributed according to regions. Many more opportunities were 
provided to those in the North, in Hutu dominated areas such as Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and 
to some extent Byumba. Gisenyi, the president’s home province (and his wife’s) had the 
highest number of foreign scholarships.80 Most elites who gained scholarships went to 
France and also Belgium, often returning to form part of the Hutu government and or 
ending up in the Akazu. Scholarships did not benefit areas such as Kibuye and Kibungo 
that were considered to be inhabited by the Tutsi population. 
  
The role of the Catholic Church 
Since the colonial period the church played a central role as a political institution in its 
engagement in Rwanda.81 Apart from the classroom setting, the church, especially the 
Catholic Church, assumed a central role in Rwandan education. Every corner of Rwanda 
had a catholic church. As per schools, White Fathers or Rwandan Priests trained in 
seminaries headed Parishes. Rwanda was reputed to be one of the most overtly 
religious countries in Africa with over 80% of the population being Roman Catholic 
believers between the 1960s and 1990s.82 Catholicism went hand-in-hand with politics, 
and was often referred to in the media as an ‘umbilical relationship’. It was thus 
important that all the post-colonial and powerful Hutu presidents were baptised 
Catholics – it was part of their identity. Every young man and woman, who wanted to 
develop in Rwanda, needed to be baptised by the Catholic Church to be considered 
modern. In Rwanda, priests were feared, respected, adored and at times Bishops were 
even worshiped and praised. A Bishop assumed similar social position that the King 
occupied in pre-colonial Rwanda: he was a divine appointment, which was trusted and 
feared by politicians and presidents. Visits to the Vatican, or visits of a Pope or Catholic 
cardinal to Rwanda, were more organised than that of a European Head of State.83  
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Destroying the divinity of the Rwandan King, with the 1931 deposition of King Musinga 
referred to above, impacted considerably on Rwanda’s political structure of Rwanda, 
and the church consistently engaged actively in the ethnic politics that emerged. The 
missionaries, for instance, not only promoted the racial hierarchical divisions in 
Rwanda but chose to ignore the importance of other social divisions. Region and clan 
identities, among others in Rwanda, were ignored in preference of the Hutu, Tutsi and 
Twa being the most important social identities. This perspective shaped both the 
European engagement in Rwanda and, more importantly, reshaped social realities 
whereby discrimination along ethnic identities was legitimised.84 Priests, Nuns and 
Bishops communicated moral lessons about the ethics of killing, interpreting what 
identity means and how to act as a result of this understanding. The prominence of the 
Church in Rwandan society, and their compliance in the racialized ideology that had 
taken root, would be demonstrated during the 1994 genocide. When the massacres 
began thousands of people sought refuge and protection in the churches, which then 
became sites of mass killings.85 Bishops and other clergies were actively involved, both 
directly and indirectly, in the massacres, and the Catholic Church overwhelmingly mute 
and blind to the atrocities.86  
International Community support 
The overt and underlying structural discrimination and divisive inequality prevalent in 
Rwanda did not stop international community considering it a development success 
story. A 1982 World Bank Report explicitly commented: ‘Rwanda’s approach to 
economic and social development could be considered successful.’87  Rwanda was one of 
the most aided countries in the world, receiving a much donor-aid than private 
investment and commercial export revenues combined.  
 
Prior to 1994, not one of the 200 plus NGOs and bilateral and multilateral donor 
representatives in the country denounced the official racism or increasingly divided 
society, even in the 1990s when it became clear that mass killings were being 
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prepared.88 Donor agencies seemingly adopted a policy of “voluntary blindness” to the 
politics of injustice, exclusion and prejudice in Rwanda.89 Foreigners working with or in 
Rwanda seemed to take the identity categories for granted, assuming them to be an 
intrinsic part of Rwandan society and thus learned to ignore the marginalisation of the 
Tutsis (and Southern Hutus). Continued World Bank support indicated to the Rwandan 
Hutu elites that their discriminatory practices were acceptable. Donors were operating 
in an apolitical, technocratic bubble that cast Rwanda as a “development problem” that 
could be - and was - being “solved” through planning, infrastructural development and 
research, with projects designed and overseen by their international “experts”.90  
External conversations: reaction and refugees 
Just as the colonial marginalisation of Hutu had eventually led to resentment and 
reaction, however, the 1980s into the 1990s saw a push to open up conversations on 
political leadership and political parties. Disenfranchised Southerners, politicians from 
mixed families, and a few Tutsis were involved. The Twa’s voice, as ever, was ignored 
and discussion of their identity existed in silence. Habyarimana’s government had 
sought to move Twas into their own villages in a given region. Framed as a development 
policy, this simply excluded them from national conversations. Twas largely became 
disengaged citizens who were rarely consulted on any matters of society, including 
those that directly concerned their lives.91  
 
Outside of Rwanda’s carefully managed domestic conversable spaces, the First and 
Second Republics saw refugee exiles formulating their own conceptions of identity, 
belonging, and Rwandaness. These would become chief protagonists in the Rwandan 
state-building narrative in the 1990s and beyond. Refugees, or the ‘political exiles’, were 
Rwandan (Tutsi) refugees led by a small group of elites who had fled to Uganda at the 
beginning of Hutu oppression in 1959.92 Other Rwandan ‘migrants of Rwanda culture’ 
had existed previously, being those who had a shared identity but were displaced by 
colonial boundaries or economic migrants who had voluntarily fled to Uganda, 
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Tanganyika (now Tanzania) and the Congo.93 By 1959 it was estimated for instance that 
350,000 Rwandan migrants already lived in Uganda (with similar numbers in Zaire),94 
but the refugees who fled the ‘little genocide’ during the decolonialisation period were a 
somewhat different breed.95 Unlike the previous migrants, who had more or less settled 
in their host countries, the refugees who emerged from the Rwandan post-colonial state 
maintained a strong sense of identity and were considered different from the hosts.  
 
The idea of going home, therefore, was central to how they defined themselves and 
related to their host countries. The elite Tutsi refugees constantly mounted border raids 
in Rwanda -popularly known as Inyenzi (cockroach) raids - which helped entrench anti-
Tutsi sentiment in Rwanda and anti-immigrant sentiment in Uganda. They also led to 
further refugees fleeing to Uganda. But the networking of the elite refugees in their host 
countries, especially in Uganda, changed the dynamics considerably in the late 1960s 
and 1970s: they advanced socio-economically; organised; and became influential 
politically in the country, regionally and internationally; eventually becoming an 
existential threat to the Obote government in Uganda.96  
 
The refugee organization Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU), created in 1979 
in Uganda, immediately articulated a military option (known as option "O") for 
returning home if needed. As Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni began his five-year guerrilla 
war against Milton Obote in 1981, his National Resistance Army (NRA) included several 
key figures in the Rwandan refugee movement.97 Fred Gisa Rwigema, Paul Kagame and 
Sam Byaruhanga joined NRA as part of their training and preparation for their intended 
future military invasion in Rwanda.98  
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Following NRA’s 1986 victory in Uganda and Museveni’s ascendancy to President, 
RANU transformed in to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) after long discussions at its 
1987 Congress.99 The creation of RPF gave the movement new orientation impetus 
toward awakening the Rwandan Diaspora. Trained cadres crisscrossed all regions 
where diaspora lived creating cells, political schools, and training camps.  Monthly 
meetings took place in Uganda. Recruiting Hutu and associating them with the RPF 
initiative to liberate the Rwandan people constituted an essential aspect of the political 
program of the RPF.100 The relatively few Hutu refugees were contacted in Zaire, 
Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania. The RPF quickly became and serious and capable 
military force.101 As Alexis Kanyarengwe recalls about meeting Fred Rwigema:  
 
“Fred was a very simple, respectful man; he had cordial relations with 
people. His intentions and his words translated into acts. It was not loose 
talk (ntibyari igipindi). He was someone with a great military experience; a 
respected man who commanded attention. When you exchanged with him, 
you were quickly filled with what he said to you. The problem with many 
people is that you are never sure that their words correspond to their acts. I 
was promptly convinced by what he said to me. I saw that he had the 
capacity to lead, and I felt that I could assist him. That is why I accepted 
responsibilities in the RPF. I knew the country, I had relations and I knew 
politicians.”102  
 
Habyarimana’s government intensified anti-Tutsi sentiments whilst these organising 
efforts outside Rwanda were taking place. In 1992, for example, the then Minister of 
Secondary Education opposed discrimination against Tutsi in schools. She was 
immediately cautioned by the regime and discriminatory quotas were radicalized. At 
the same time, a militia for the ruling political parties (CDR and MRND) was created.103 
An extremist media supportive of the MRND regime further promoted a racialised and 
anti-Tutsi Hutu identity. Finally, the Interahamwe (those who attack together) were a 
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group of young rebels being trained to hate and kill Tutsi (and moderate Hutu). These 
actors would now become the key players in a war and failed settlement that ultimately 
led to genocide.   
The role of popular culture in the learning of identity 
Rwandans who had a stake in preserving the categories and their prescribed hierarchal 
meaning understood the importance of employing popular culture to consolidate 
differences. No longer were the terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi” simply in reference to ethnic 
categories; but their entrenchment into society meant that they had real psychological 
and emotional implications. The Hutu Ten Commandments, published in the popular 
media forum, the Kangura newspaper, were taught around villages and in different 
communities to offer a set of rules that would guide the Hutu population. The Ten 
Commandments, authored and published by Hassan Ngeze, was a document of identity 
reference.  They were as follows; (translated in English as they were composed in 
Kinyarwanda) 
 
1. Every Hutu must know that the Tutsi woman, wherever she may be, is working 
for the Tutsi ethnic cause. In consequence, any Hutu is a traitor who: 
 Acquires a Tutsi wife; 
 Acquires a Tutsi concubine; 
 Acquires a Tutsi secretary or protégée. 
2. Every Hutu must know that our Hutu daughters are more worthy and more 
conscientious as women, as wives and as mothers. Aren’t they lovely, excellent 
secretaries, and more honest! 
3. Hutu women, be vigilant and make sure that your husbands, brothers and sons 
see reason. 
4.  All Hutus must know that all Tutsis are dishonest in business. Their only goal is 
ethnic superiority. We have learned this by experience from experience. In 
consequence, any Hutu is a traitor who: 
 Forms a business alliance with a Tutsi 
 Invests his own funds or public funds in a Tutsi enterprise 
 Borrows money from or loans money to a Tutsi 
 Grants favors to Tutsis (import licenses, bank loans, land for 
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construction, public markets.) 
5. Strategic positions such as politics, administration, economics, the military and 
security must be restricted to the Hutu. 
6. A Hutu majority must prevail throughout the educational system (pupils, 
scholars, and teachers). 
7. The Rwandan Army must be exclusively Hutu. The war of October 1990 has 
taught us that. No soldier may marry a Tutsi woman. 
8.  Hutu must stop taking pity on the Tutsi. 
9. Hutu wherever they are must stand united, in solidarity, and concerned with the 
fate of their Hutu brothers. Hutu within and without Rwanda must constantly 
search for friends and allies to the Hutu Cause, beginning with their Bantu 
brothers. Hutu must constantly counter Tutsi propaganda. Hutu must stand firm 
and vigilant against their common enemy: the Tutsi. 
10. The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961 and the Hutu Ideology 
must be taught to Hutu of every age. Every Hutu must spread the word wherever 
he goes. Any Hutu who persecutes his brother Hutu for spreading and teaching 
this ideology is a traitor. 104 
 
By the start of the 1990s many Rwandans had chosen (or been forced to choose) a 
certain ethnic affiliation, or believed they were Hutu or Tutsi. These identities were 
somewhat dynamic, however. Identity cards were often brought or fabricated in order 
to access particular opportunities. Those from mixed marriages in particular were able 
to change their identity and belonging when it suited a particular circumstance at any 
given time. An estimated 20% of army officers were Tutsi carrying Hutu ID cards, many 
of whom were ‘open secrets’.105 Some Tutsi, especially from the North, were convinced 
of their Hutu identity as they believed that no body from their particular area could be a 
Tutsi due to the prevailing regional-ethnic stereotypes.  
 
Pop culture became prominently influential in the years preceding war and genocide. 
Simoni Bikindi music was extremely popular and aired acted in a similar manner to the 
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Ten Commandments, providing guidelines for what could be considered a “true Hutu”. 
Bikindi’s hatred for RPF sympathizers or Tutsis was clear. His songs would be played 
heavily on extremist radio stations during the 1994 genocide, and in 2008 the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) found him guilty of inciting 
genocide. Bikindi had mastered the art of popularising and spreading ideas he had 
learned in University and other forms of education - primary and high school – which 
had carried the undertones of the myths about Rwandan identity that had been 
fabricated by the colonial powers. 
  
Bikindi’s music illustrates just one case in which artists were influential in educating the 
public about identity. Commencing in the 1980s Bikindi composed and performed his 
music with his cultural group in the tunes of traditional genres that encouraged and led 
his fans to dance. Some of his most famous compositions included: Intabaza which was 
also popularly known as Bene Sebahinizi (The Sons of the Cultivators) - meaning that 
Hutus could be identified according to the colonial theories, which had identified them 
as farmers; Ingabo z’ igihugu – a song he composed for the government’s army to 
motivate soldiers who were fighting against the RPF insurgency between 1990-1994; 
Nimwe mwariraye ingabo z’ u Rwanda – a song expressing the Rwandan army is the one 
that always won the battle; Twasezereye ingoma ya cyami na gikoronize, - another about 
resisting colonialism and the oppression of kingdoms.  
 
Bikindi’s songs provide clear examples of how the public was educated though this 
informal yet influential means of music. Bikindi began his “teaching” songs with 
traditional instruments. He used the umuduri which was an instrument similar to the 
western violin; the ingoma, a drum which was important in Rwandan culture; and 
sounds of amayojyi y’ intore, the bells worn on the legs of young male dancers. In one 
song, Nanga Abahutu, (composed in 1993 as the battle between the Rwanda Patriotic 
Front (RPF) and the army of the Rwandan government was intensifying in the North), 
Bikindi rebuked any Hutus who were known to be supporting the Tutsis-dominated 
RPF. The lyrics were:  
 
Nanga Abahutu, nanga abahutu basebya ubuhutu. 
Benwacu, Abo bahutu batiyizi, biyibagizwa icyo baricyo 
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Nanga abo bahutu bagenda batabona iyo bagana (x2) 
 
I hate those Hutus, those de-hutuized Hutus, who have given up 
their identity, dear comrades. I hate those Hutus, those Hutus who 
walk blindly (x2) 
 
Ibyo bicucu,barwana intambara batazi icyo igamije 
Nanga abo bahutu abo bahutu umuntu azana kwica bakica abandi 
bahutu 
Kandi kubanga nibyo byiza (x2) 
 
Fools, naive Hutus committed in a war of which they do not know 
the cause,” he has written. I hate those Hutus who can be brought 
to kill and who, I swear, kill Hutus, dear comrades. And if I hate 
them, its all for the better. 
 
His songs were easy to sing and memorise and had an “infectious” rhythm, making them 
popular at weddings or at other social gatherings. By playing it in social events, or 
during public government events the song inflated hatred in the masses minds. The 
song forced people to decide whether or not they hated Tutsis. It encouraged the 
masses to be good Hutus and to hate Tutsis who did not deserve to be liked, or 
associated with. In 1992 and 1993, various high schools began rioting, with many 
refusing to be taught by Tutsi teachers, or their Tutsi principals. The idea of hating the 
Tutsi became a reality when “Tutsi-like” students were being harassed in schools, both 
by teachers and their Hutu colleagues. The song was always sang whenever riots were 
held. They were also played on RTLM radio, popular with the masses in rural areas who, 
tended to follow whatever their local government official or in this case the radio 
dictated. 
 
Post-colonial Rwanda under those two Republics had therefore witnessed a complete 
turn in the form and actors in conversation although the conversable spaces had 
maintained some consistencies. A new set of national actors took over from where 
colonial leaders stopped, with having reinforced the central conversation on identity. 
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Those in conversation and the conversable spaces had become more diverse with 
educational spaces, refugee spaces outside Rwanda and social spaces within the country 
increasing in sophistication and forms of expression. The military space would return to 
significance with the violent form of this conversation achieving prominence from 1990 
until the genocide. 





PART II:Pre-genocide Rwanda and attempts at political settlement 
The pre-genocide political atmosphere of the late 1980s and early 1990s amplified the 
question of Tutsi refugees who had fled to neighbouring countries. The refugee issue, 
had for a very long time, remained suspended and had no solution. The involvement of 
Rwandans in counter-insurgency operations in Museveni-led National Resistance 
Movement and the perception that the refugees were benefiting from resources such as 
land resulted to anti-refugee sentiments from within Uganda.106 The un-official 
response by the Rwandan government to refugee calls that they wished to return home 
was that the country had limited space and Rwanda was full.107 It could not accept any 
other people. In 1986, Uganda’s Museveni attempted a rapprochement between 
Habyarimana and the refugees in his country, but Habyarimana said that Rwanda would 
only accept returnees who were well educated and could add value, but not the general 
refugee population.108  
This polarising rhetoric further entrenched anti-Tutsi sentiments in Rwanda. In seeking 
to dominate and manage those discussions around the refugees, the Akazu intellectuals 
sought to clarify who belonged to the Hutu identity and the privileges that should be 
accorded to them. The 10 commandments of Hutus were an effort to reunite Hutus in all 
regions and disregard the regional identities that had taken root. Symbols and art were 
also used to unify Hutu identity, such as the isuka (a hoe) indicating the noble Hutu 
profession of agriculture. Under Habyarimana’s government, France became the most 
influential foreign power in the country, overtaking Belgium. The French not only 
propped up Habyarimana through military support, but also reinforced the official 
narratives on Hutu entitlement and about the Northerners involvement in political 
power.  This ‘Faustian bargain’ in return gave France favourable access to trade deals in 
Rwanda and positioned them strategically in the region.109 There was also personal 
friendship between both presidents’ families of Mitterrand and Habyarimana. 
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Increasing hostility in host countries and the Habyarimana government’s unwillingness 
to resolve tensions over the social exclusion issues left the refugees with increasingly 
limited options. The RPF took up arms and conflict ensued.110 The UN-led Arusha peace 
talks indicated that the International actors were alert to the increasingly violent local 
conversations in Rwanda that also had serious regional implications. Although the 
political settlement processes in Rwanda are not deliberately sequenced events, this 
study categorises events in a yearly, and at times, a monthly chronological manner for 
purposes of describing the process. In this regard, pre-genocide Rwanda and attempts 
at political settlement can be classified into five main phases. 
Phase one: Pre - genocide 1990-1992 
This phase began after an outbreak of civil war in 1990 when the Rwandan Patriotic 
Army (RPA)—armed wing of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)—based in Uganda 
invaded Rwanda from the northern regions on 1 October 1990.111 Gerard Prunier 
observed that political instability and deteriorating economic conditions in the country 
contributed to the crisis. Prunier argues that ‘shrinking’ sources of revenue from 
agriculture and mining – a major source of enrichment for the elite led to fierce internal 
power struggles as competition for the declining resources intensified. This situation 
was exacerbated the government increasing taxes especially among peasant farmers 
and cutting social services amidst threats from drought and declining food production. 
Government reaction to criticism was heavy-handed with repression of opposition 
groups and the press.112  Combined with the crisis of citizenship and indigeneity of 
refugees in Uganda - which included state-sponsored repression, exclusion, expulsion 
and prejudice of Rwandan migrants and refugees - RPF deemed the time ripe to launch 
their invasion.113 
 
Officially, the Rwandan government considered the RPF attack as a surprise.114  The 
first reaction of Habyarimana was to alert his Western godfathers whom he 
immediately visited upon leaving a UNICEF conference. He also alerted his regional 
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friends.115 The conflict was instantly internationalized with the military implication of 
the European countries (Belgium and France), and African countries (Zaire).116 The 
Kigali regime immediately began arresting presumed accomplices (ibyitso): Tutsi and 
Hutu who held critical views on the regime. Approximately 8.000 persons, in reality 
more, were arrested and imprisoned in inhumane conditions. In the government 
propaganda, it was now a foreign aggression led by Uganda. The RPF was presented as 
the reincarnation of the Inyenzi (cockroach), representatives of Tutsi monarchists 
whose objective was to reinstall the monarchy and to exploit the Hutu by nullifying the 
achievements of the "1959 revolution". For the Kigali regime and its French allies, the 
RPF had the support of the English-speaking and Anglo-Saxon countries to destabilize a 
French-speaking State.117 
 
The RPF demanded that President Habyarimana’s government allowed refugees to 
return to Rwanda, prepare for elections, adopt a new constitution, respect human rights 
and the rule of law, and reduce the powers of the President.118  As RPF gained ground on 
the battlefield, the government promised political reforms and attempted to negotiate a 
settlement by establishing a refugee repatriation programme.119 These attempts failed 
when it became clear to the RPF that the government was trying to covertly exploit 
factionalism within the RPF army whilst trying to mobilise military support from 
foreign allies.120   
 
Pressure from both the international and regional community demanding Rwanda 
liberalise governance of the state through increased political and media freedoms 
inadvertently worsened the situation in several ways. The constitutional reforms 
process that paved the way for plurality and emergence of opposition political parties in 
August 1991 took place entirely within northern and southern Hutu political elites in 
President Habyarimana’s dominant party – Movement Révolutionnaire National pour le 
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Développement (MRND).121 The ruling political elites (including those in the army and 
civil service) exploited existing ethnic cleavages and regional differences between the 
Hutu and Tutsi to re-arm and mobilise support for ‘Hutu power,’ and confronted the 
weakening dominance of the MRND. In 1992 they mobilised radical youth groups such 
as the Interahamwe in MRND to attack opposition parties. At the core of this strategy 
was ‘racialised political discourse’ aimed at ensuring survival of the state by eliminating 
of the political enemies [which meant the Tutsi] and reinstating Hutu dominance.122  
 
Opening up of the press also had dramatic unintended consequences. Independence of 
media led to the establishment of both private press and radio owned and operated by 
political elites and Hutu extremists allied to MRND who eventually used it to spread 
Hutu Power propaganda and ideology.123 The RPF invasion and the ensuing state-
sanctioned extremism - especially with the formation of CDR party in 1992 - re-ignited, 
crystallised and reinforced politicisation of ethnicity between the Hutu and Tutsi.124  
 
Prunier notes that during this time, massacres were a common feature and mainly 
preceded political meetings during which a sensibilisation - putting peasants ‘in the 
mood’ to prepare them to kill the RPF and their sympathisers - process was carried 
out.125 More importantly was the manner in which the elite used the sensibilisation 
process to manipulate societal culture and traditional identities of the peasantry. For 
instance, after the political meetings the state through the ministry of interior would 
sanction the killings with a coded calling for special umuganda (collective work session) 
and bourgmestre ‘bush clearing’.  These were identifiable with the illiterate peasants 
                                                 
121 Kakwenzire, Joan, & Kamukama, Dixon. "The development and consolidation of extremist forces in Rwanda 1990-
1994." In Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds. The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. 
New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Publishers, 1999. pp. 66-68. 
122 For a detailed explanation on this see, Hintjens, Helen M. "Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda." The Journal 
of Modern African Studies. (1999): 241-286..; Mamdani, When victims become killers, pp.189-211. 
123 This role of the media in the pre and post genocide in Rwanda for example, use of the Hutu owned magazine, 
Kangura to spread propaganda and Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) to misinform and spread hate 
messages, has been extensively discussed in Thompson, A. (Ed.). (2007). The media and the Rwanda genocide. IDRC. 
However, a contentious question has been whether propaganda fomented the genocide. A recent paper by David 
Yanagizawa-Drott gives convincing empirical analysis of the link between media and conflict and argues that of under 
certain conditions, propaganda spread through mass media especially one that that encourages violence against 
defenceless and vulnerable ethnic minority groups, is capable of instigating participation in violence. See, 
Yanagizawa-Drott, David. "Propaganda and conflict: Theory and evidence from the Rwandan genocide." Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, forthcoming (2010). 
124 Langford, Peter. "The Rwandan Path to Genocide: the Genesis of the Capacity of the Rwandan Post-Colonial State 
to Organise and Unleash a Project of Extermination." Civil Wars. 7.1, 2005, pp.1-27.. 
125 Prunier, Op.Cit., pp 137-138.  
39 
 
and piggybacked on the traditional political culture of a ‘systematic, centralised and 
unconditional obedience to authority.’126  
 
Conversely, RPA attacks further bolstered Hutu extremism and more importantly, 
militarisation of the society through the national army, Forces Armées Rwandaises 
(FAR) troops, and French forces.127  The Rwandan government used the tense political 
situation to arbitrarily arrest Tutsi intelligentsia and elite businessmen as well as 
moderate Hutu sympathisers.128 Massive displacement of people also occurred in most 
of RPA occupied territories.  Instability from the civil war led to immense suffering both 
from massive internal displacement and the collapse of the economy. This eventually 
led to declaration of a ceasefire in August 1992, and the opening of negotiations 
between the government and the RPF.129 
 
Phase two: Peace negotiations:  sub-regional mediation pre-Arusha 
Initiatives to end the conflict in Rwanda began after RPF’s invasion. This began with the 
attempts by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Belgium, France, US and countries 
like Tanzania and Uganda to bring together Habyarimana’s government and RPF.130 
President Habyarimana unwillingly accepted sub-regional mediation. Negotiations 
focused on ending the violence rather than the broader vision of unity of the country. 
The RPF was present in most of the meetings they were invited to. Such opportunities 
were used by RPF to show their goodwill, but ceasefire also gave a chance for RPA 
troops to rest and train.131 The key moments in the sub-regional efforts to end the 
conflict prior to the Arusha negotiations include:132  
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1. On 17th October 1990: Mwanza communique following the meeting of three 
presidents (J.Habyarimana, Museveni and Mwinyi). The communique stated that: 
“the Rwandan government is committed to initiate a dialogue with the 
opposition, both internally and externally, under the auspices of the Secretary 
General of the Organization of African Unity”. 
2. On 26th October 1990: Gbadolite Agreements. Museveni, Chair of the OAU, joined 
the presidents of Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda, meeting in the framework of the 
CEPGL.133 The Presidents of Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda had spoken, on 23rd and 
24th, about the problem of Rwanda. Museveni was informed of the results: 
reaffirmation of resolutions contained in the Mwanza Comminique. The four 
heads of state spoke of an "African peacekeeping force" to monitor the cease-fire 
and the principle of a group of observers from neighbouring countries is 
maintained. The heads of state mandated President Mobutu of Zaire to act as an 
intermediary between the two warring sides and reaffirmed the proposal of a 
regional summit on the problem of refugees. 
3. On 19th February 1991: Dar-es-salaam declaration on refugees. It is in this 
statement that the Heads of State and Government of the sub-region and the 
Secretary General of the OAU mandated Mobutu to “take immediate and urgent 
action likely to establish a dialogue leading to a formal cease-fire between the 
government and the RPF”. 
4. On 17th February 1991: Zanzibar meeting (between Habyarimana, Museveni and 
President Mwinyi of Tanzania), preceded by the Cyanika meeting at the Rwanda-
Uganda border (between Museveni and Habyarimana) of 20th November 1990. 
They reaffirmed the Mwanza line of internal and external dialogue and holding a 
regional conference on refugees (scheduled for 19th February 1991 in Dar-es-
salaam). Habyarimana promised to observe a cease-fire starting from 18th 
February 1991 at 10:00.  Museveni promised to exert pressure on the armed 
opposition to observe the cease-fire at the same time. It was rather an effort to 
ease tension between Museveni and Habyarimana. The official release said: “... 
                                                                                                                                                        
documents are accessible at Revue Dialogue office, Kigali, Nyamirambo.  
133 CEPGL - Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs (in English ECGLC - The Economic Community of the 
Great Lakes Countries).   
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the two presidents met in front of a mediator who helped them to resolve their 
conflict.”134 
5. On 25th March 1991: signing of the cease-fire agreement between the 
government and the RPF at N'sele. By signing the agreement with the RPF at 
N'sele, Habyarimana government recognised for the first time the RPF as a 
political partner. There was a clause stipulating that belligerents must reach a 
“political settlement.” This agreement remained also a dead letter because 
immediately after its signing, the RPF and the government accused each other of 
violating the cease-fire. In Kigali, the N'sele agreement was somehow seen as an 
act of surrender of the RPF. As soon as he returned to Kigali, Mr. Casimir 
Bizimungu, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, in an interview with Radio 
Rwanda, interpreted it in that sense. The President even declared he had 
increased the number of positions on the Rwanda-Uganda border where the 
Inkotanyi could lay down their arms and surrender to the Rwandan Armed 
Forces (ngo bazaze bamanitse amaboko).135 
 
The RPF military pressure, the international community and the advent of Rwandan 
Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye’s coalition government compelled the launch of 
serious peace negotiations. This process began with the meeting, for the first time, of 
the Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs, B.Ngulinzira with the RPF’s P. Mazimpaka in 
Entebbe (May 24, 1992); followed by government and the RPF delegations meeting in 
Paris June 6 to 8, 1992 where they agreed to the formal negotiations. Mobutu was 
officially agreed as the mediator, but the President of Tanzania was designated as 
facilitator. Negotiations would focus on the fate of the two armies, the problem of power 
sharing, guarantees for fundamental freedoms and the broad-based government.  
Phase three: Arusha negotiation 
Arusha negotiations were to begin on 10th August 1992, and originally scheduled to be 
completed no later than 10th January 1993. Two main issues emerged from this phase. 
First, was the failure of the Arusha process to move beyond power-sharing discussions 
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between political elites, to a genuine negotiated agreement that provided lasting peace 
and reconciliation. The majority of the interested parties were never focused on 
engaging the underlying causes of conflict and national cleavages, but instead seeking a 
peace, which would suit their own agenda.136 Second, was the inability of external 
actors to assist in the creation of these conditions during the process.   
 
Initially, RPF and the Rwandan Coalition Government, agreed to a three-month ceasefire 
to end hostilities but on condition that a joint political military commission be 
established to serve as a complaints mechanism, and that each party retains the 
territory occupied (i.e., RPF’s northern region and the rest of the territory respectively), 
separated by neutral corridor to be monitored by an Organization of African Union 
(OAU) led Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG). This was later followed by a 
thirteen-month negotiation process to agree on the following core principles: 
 
i. Establishing of the rule of law on national unity, democracy, pluralism and 
respect for human rights;  
ii. Formation of national army consisting of government forces and RPF; 
iii. Establishment of power-sharing framework within the framework of a 
Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG).  
 
The first principle was quickly agreed on.  However, the latter two issues were to 
become the cornerstone of the Arusha accord; they were repeatedly postponed due to 
disagreements among the political elites and eventually did not happen.137 The 
President’s circle plan was to assert the merits of the negotiations, while criticising the 
manner in which the government delegation was conducting them.138 The Rwandan 
government believed that power sharing had existed since the coalition agreement of 
16th April 1992, which had allowed for opposition parties in Rwanda. The RPF could 
therefore be integrated into the existing framework, but the Arusha delegations had no 
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right to discuss an distribution of power.139 The RPF, however, insisted on a new 
framework, which restricted the President’s power.  
 
Rwandan political parties who were opposed to the MRND sought to be involved in the 
process.140 Habyarimana refused, but did seek to engage those parties who were part of 
the coalition government.141 He vocally opposed the removal of CND (Conseil national de 
développement) from discussions (which the RPF was pushing for) and in November 
began launching a severe criticism against Arusha.142 President Habyarimana declared 
the protocols already signed as “rag papers” at an MRND rally held in Ruhengeri and 
accused Foreign Minister Ngulinzira of acting independently on behalf of his party, the 
MDR, rather than government.  From then on the CDR and the MRND spoke the same 
language – they rejected the negotiations and mobilized their supporters to this end, 
insisting on the threats posed by these agreements to the interests of the ethnic 
majority. The CDR launched a slogan of “Hutu, be on your guard;”143 whilst the MRND’s 
was slogan was “Do not accept contempt,”144 as they denounced “the betrayal by the 
political parties.”145  
 
Extremists within the MRND and CDR were taking hold, and rallying supporters against 
potential power sharing and the reorganisation of the army. A statement by Léon 
Mugesera, the vice president of MRND sums the tension at the time: 
 
“The opposition parties have plotted with the enemy to make the Byumba 
préfecture fall to the Inyenzi [cockroaches]. […] They have plotted to 
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undermine our armed forces. […] The law is quite clear on this point: ‘Any 
person who is guilty of acts aiming at sapping the moral of the armed forces 
will be condemned to death.’ What are we waiting for? […] And what about 
those accomplices (ibyitso) here who are sending children to the RPF? Why 
are we waiting to get rid of these families? […] We have to take responsibility 
into our own hands and wipe out these hoodlums.”146 
 
The negotiations eventually resumed, but with the MRND still in fear of being 
marginalised in decision-making processes if the proposed power-sharing arrangement 
materialised (which included a 2/3 majority being required in the Council of Ministers). 
The MRND wanted a “balanced” peace agreement and institutions marked by power 
sharing, “not just transfer of power to any party or group of parties.”147 It accepted the 
principle of appointment of members of parliament by the parties. The 16 parties would 
be represented as follows: small parties - 12 seats, ARD - 29 seats, FDC and the RPF 
together - 29 seats. The Speaker of Parliament would go to the MRND, the Deputy-
Speaker to the MDR, and the Secretariat to the CDR. Supreme Court Chair would go to 
PSD, the Courts to MRND, the Cassation Court to RPF, the Constitutional Court to PECO, 
a small party, the State Council to MDR and the Court of Auditors to PL. The transition 
was to continue until the of that Parliamentary period, which was December 1993.  
 
The RPF and the FDC saw in the negotiations the opportunity to break the institutional 
imbalance after the failure of the war. Yet the consequences of the negotiations were the 
very causes of their blockage: questioning the Constitution, dissolution of the CND, 
opting for a parliamentary system, the transfer of powers from the President to the 
Cabinet. The MRND considered that it had made many concessions: accepting the 
revision of the constitution, the transfer of the essential powers of the President to the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet and the establishment of a parliamentary system. But it 
argued that real peace could only come after the establishment of institutions made 
legitimate by elections.148  
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RPF progress in the talks was largely determined by their battlefield victories but the 
concessions realised did not materialise. When military victories were won by RPF, the 
government was forced to negotiate.149 As these continued the Rwandan government 
was forced to agree these fairly conciliatory terms. But that did not mean the 
agreements would be implemented. The year 1992 ended with disappointment as the 
peace agreement that many Rwandans expected did not appear. Tension mounted. 
Kigali was paralyzed at New Year's Eve. In the prefectures of Gisenyi and Kibuye, MRND 
and CDR youths attacked the Bagogwe, especially in Rutsiro. In Ruhengeri, they set up 
roadblocks. On the eve of the crisis in February 1993, the CDR, in its meetings and 
documents, put forward requests to review the agreements signed on 30th October 
1992 and 9th January 1993.150 In March 1993 the party (CDR) began defying the 
President by issuing a communique which accused him of ceasing to care about the 
Rwandan nation.151  
 
The crisis of human rights experienced in the country for sometime was confirmed by a 
survey conducted by an International Commission.152 This commission was invited by 
the local human rights associations to investigate the violations of human rights in 
Rwanda. It was composed of 10 members, with Alison Des Forges coordinating the 
activities. MRND was opposed to the arrival of the mission, but the Cabinet approved it. 
The Commission arrived in the country on 7 January 1993. They visited 5 out of the 11 
Prefectures (Rural Kigali, Kigali City, Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and Byumba) in January 1993 
to investigate allegations of human rights abuses.  They found that there were 
systematic massacres of the Tutsi and of the Hutu opposed to the regime. Concerning 
the Tutsi, the International Commission concluded that there was deliberate and 
organised policy by the Rwandan government to to exterminate one ethnic group, the 
Tutsi ethnic group.153  
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According to Jean Carbonare, a member of the same commission, France’s support for 
the military power organizing these crimes meant they shared the responsibility.154 The 
Commission accused the FAR of being involved in violations of human rights, making 
arbitrary arrests, and performing summary executions.  The Commission also suspected 
the RPF to be responsible "for attacks on civilian targets such as hospitals, schools and 
camps for displaced persons". The commission accused them of kidnapping civilians, 
destroying civilian homes in the area, deporting civilians to Uganda and enlisting 
children (13 years) as RPF soldiers. In this context, negotiations resumed on 29th 
January 1993 but were immediately blocked again. The RPF requested the increasing 
massacres be stopped and a guarantee that they would never be resumed, and 
appropriate punishments be applied to those involved. The MRND and the CDR ignored 
these requests, and the war resumed on 8th February 1993.155  
 
The Arusha Accord attempted to broadly recognise issues of systematic exclusion of the 
Tutsi community at a national level. But it was less clear on modalities of how to 
implement divisive issues such as how to share power within the transitional 
government - mainly presidential powers - as well as how to integrate the government 
and rebel forces into the national army156 Even more importantly, the Rwanda 
government, regional and international actors in the Arusha process paid less attention 
to other on-going forms of exclusion at societal level, and systematic forms of violence 
that had begun to emerge during the civil war.157  
  
Two things to note with external intervention, especially the OAU mechanism, was the 
classical peacekeeping dilemma posed by paucity of resources to fund interventions as 
well as idiosyncrasies of non-interference, respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of states. Like many other post-cold war conflicts although there was 
willingness among OAU member states to deploy peacekeeping forces - in Rwanda it 
                                                 
154 Ibid., p.52.  
155 Interview with Mugesera Antoine, Kigali, 2015.   
156 See Jones, Arusha peace process, pp. 141 – 142.  
157 Anacleti, Odhiambo. "The Regional Response to the Rwandan Emergency". Journal of Refugee Studies. 9 (3): 1996. 
303-311. Widespread atrocities were perpetuated by both the RPF and FAR. For a summary of this offensive see 
Prunier. Op.Cit., pp. 173-191. 
47 
 
agreed to deploy NMOG to monitor the ceasefire - most states were non-committal to 
funding of the force and instead OAU had to rely on western states for funds.158   
 
Secondly, while focus was directed to resolution of the conflict through negotiations and 
mediation, the Arusha negotiations - now colloquially termed as a ‘stillbirth’ – with 
hindsight was a futile initiative.159 Of particular importance in this regard, was that by 
the time preventive diplomatic and negotiation missions were starting, the RPF had 
already gained the upper hand from the battlefield victories against the FAR controlled 
territories. Also, the relative failure of regional peace processes to mitigate the conflict 
was somewhat inevitable due to lack of neutrality. While diplomacy and mediation 
efforts were crucial in the conflict management process, restricting the process to this 
option when the violence had escalated to a critical level had severe consequences, 
among them the capacity of peacekeepers to use force in situations of extreme 
hostilities. 160 Impartiality of regional actors shifted the role to international actors - 
whose interest and political will to intervene in Rwanda at the time was exceedingly 
marginal.161 The latter came to bedevil the implementation phase.   
Phase four: Manoeuvres to block implementation of Arusha Accords 
The Arusha Accords were signed on 4th August 1993 in the presence of the presidents of 
countries in the sub-region. CDR and MDR-PARMEHUTU did not send representatives to 
Arusha. The displaced persons, Civil Society and the majority of registered political 
parties greeted the signing warmly.162 The latter signed a code of ethics, to the 
exception of the MRND, CDR and MDR-PARMEHUTU, which had been opposed to 
negotiations since the beginning. The agreement was, for many people, a factor of 
national reconciliation and a reason for hope. ‘A memorable day, a day to say goodbye 
to out dated ideas, a day of pride for Rwandans who will now live in unity and peace,’ 
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said an editorial of Radio Rwanda.163 The deadline for the establishment of transitional 
institutions was 37 days after signing.  
 
This deadline was not observed for several reasons. By 10 September 1993, the country 
had entered an institutional vacuum. The forces opposed to the agreements took 
advantage of the situation and made the agreements ineffective. The first problem was 
created by the delay of the UN forces whose arrival was scheduled for 31st October 1993 
In September, General Dallaire said in a report that conditions were ripe for the arrival 
of peacekeepers. On 5th October 1993 the UN Security Council unanimously approved 
Resolution 872 on sending a 2,500 strong peacekeeping force (UNAMIR). 
 
The second pretext for the President and the political parties, which supported him to 
block the institutions, was based on dissension and disruption of opposition parties to 
participate in government. Since October 1993, the MRND and the CDR had provoked a 
series of violent activities and blockages: massacres, assassinations (for example the 
assassination of F. Gatabazi, 21st February 1994), interference in the problems of 
Burundi, manipulation of divisions in some political parties, unauthorized 
demonstrations to prevent the swearing-in ceremony of ministers.164 The murder of F. 
Gatabazi was followed by the murder of Bucyana, Vice-President of Interahamwe.165 
Insecurity was widespread by now, especially in the capital city. Whenever decisions 
regarding the establishment of the institutions were to be taken, violence and terrorism 
would gain in intensity with the MRND Interahamwe and the CDR Impuzamugambi.166 
 
These manoeuvres were meant to sabotage the Arusha Accords by blocking the 
establishment of the transitional government and the TNA.167 The Secretary General of 
MRND, M. Ngirumpatse, voiced the position of his party when he accused the four 
parties (MDR, PL, PSD and PDC) of planning to bring in the RPF and excluding other 
parties.168 The Prime Minister and the representative of the Secretary General of the UN 
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repeatedly called for the swearing-in ceremony for the transitional government and 
MPs.169 The President was the only person to be sworn in on January 5, 1994. Many 
meetings were convened either by the UN Representative or the Transition Prime 
Minister to ease the situation, but they all failed. President Habyarimana also convened 
some, though he was not entitled. Embassies, including the embassies of Germany and 
the United States of America, also organized meetings to help solve the impasse.170 
While all observers were concerned about the political deadlock, Habyarimana said he 
was optimistic and spoke of imminent establishment of the transitional institutions.  W. 
Claes, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that the international community and 
Belgium would not accept further delay in the implementation of the Arusha Accords.171 
The Belgian Minister of Defense, L. Delcroix, said that Belgium could not wait 
indefinitely for the establishment of the transitional institutions.172 UN Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros Ghali also warned the Rwandan factions: if the agreements 
were not enforced, withdrawal of the UNAMIR would be considered. It should also be 
noted that the RPF warned President Habyarimana, his party the MRND and CDR 
against interference in other parties and setting obstacles to the establishment of 
institutions.173 
Phase five: Implementation of Arusha accord 
This phase involved attempts to implement the two main protocols of the Arusha peace 
accord. They included: the resettlement of displaced persons, establishing the BBTG; 
formation of national army consisting of FAR and RPF. A UN-led peacekeeping force 
United Nation Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was deployed, though delayed, 
to enforce the accord.174 While the assassination of Burundi’s President Melchior 
Ndadaye by Tutsi military extremists and ensuing violence and killings against Hutu’s in 
Burundi is said to have triggered and resonated a similar impetus for Hutu extremist 
forces in Rwanda, some evidence suggests the contrary. On one hand some observers 
suggest inherent flaws where opportunities to contain the violence were missed after 
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172 Grünfeld, Fred, and Anke Huijboom. The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders. Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2007, p.119. 
173 See, Jones, The Arusha peace process, Op.Cit., pp. 139-140..  
174 Although the UNSC approved deployment of UNAMIR on 5 October 1993, the peacekeeping forces did not arrive in 
Rwanda until 1 November. This was four months after signing of the Accord.  
50 
 
failure of actors in the Arusha process to address the role of hard-line forces both in the 
Rwanda government and RPF in the process.175  
Resettlement of displaced persons 
A meeting of experts was scheduled to address the issue of security, the administration 
of the area and the return of displaced persons. The government delegation led by 
Colonel Nsengiyumva and the RPF delegation led by T. Rutaremara met at Nkumba 
(Ruhengeri) on 4th May 1993 to address all of these problems.176 But, due to a request of 
the RPF, it was postponed, due to lack of security. The real negotiations on the 
resettlement of displaced persons took place in Kinihira from 10th May 1993, under the 
chairmanship of GOMN, with the presence of observers (some ambassadors, 
representatives of UN agencies and countries in the sub-region).177 The negotiations 
were very difficult on sensitive points like administration and security. Under the 
Kinihira Accords signed on 30th May 1993, the safety zone was to be entrusted to GOMN. 
A government representative chaired this Commission. The Vice-Chair, and the 
Secretary General both came from RPF. A few days after the Kinihira Accords, 80% of 
the displaced population of the Prefecture of Byumba had returned to their homes and 
property. In accordance with the Dar-es-Salaam Accords, negotiations resumed on 
March 1993 under the chairmanship of Tanzanian Prime Minister John Malecela. On the 
agenda several issues including commitment of the RPF and government commitment 
to a negotiated settlement within the Arusha Peace Process and withdraw of foreign 
troops and therir replacement by a neutral force organised under the auspices of the 
OAU.178 
Disarmament and integration of armed forces 
The very sensitive point of the number of RPF and FAR soldiers remained pending. For 
the RPF, the Rwandan government army had to be completely dismantled because it 
had failed in its mission to defend the population and had been involved in violations of 
human rights. Because of this, the RPF proposed for a start the proportions of 27/73 (in 
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favor of RPF).179 The Government referred to the number of members of the RPF in 
parliament and government, and proposed 20/80 (in favour of FAR). After much 
discussion the facilitator proposed 35 to 40% for the RPF and 60 to 65% for the 
government with a favourable component for the RPF at the level of officers.180 The 
international community and Tanzania put pressure on the belligerents to reach a 
compromise as soon as possible. They evoked the potentially serious economic 
problems in the event the war was continued and the heavy burden of the displaced.181 
Finally, the agreement on the merger of the armies was reached in June 1993: 50% for 
RPF in command positions, 40% for the troops. The agreement on the national army 
was considered a “disaster” by CDR. According to them there were no objective criteria 
for representation in the new army; criteria were fabricated. The technical criteria for 
recruitment and demobilization were not clearly defined, while the principle of 
parallelism in command and joint command totally destroyed the power of the chief. 
The two armies had been inserted one into another, without any real chief.182 
Refugees 
The issue of refugees was very much assessed by the Arusha negotiators. The Protocol 
on refugees and displaced persons (Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Rwandese Refugees 
Problem) was signed on 19th February 1991 and the return of refugees expected after 9 
months. With this act, a phase in the liberation struggle by RPF had been achieved. In 
these discussions, RPF insisted that the refugees themselves delegate their own 
representatives.183 After the Protocol on Refugees was signed, the first movement of 
returning refugees took place in 1993: for some because they wanted to return home, 
for others because their lives were threatened in their host countries (Burundi and 
Zaire). About 10,000 people settled in Muvumba Commune under RPF control. About 
them, the Rwandan government spoke of “the infiltration of demobilized elements from 
the Ugandan army” (Minister of Defense). RPF denied this: "RPF considers that it has no 
right to oppose the initiative from any Rwandan to return home, nor the duty to refuse 
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him/her assistance.”184 The Rwandan government did not recognize them. For example, 
it would not assist Rwandan refugees grouped in Muyira and Ntyazo Communes who 
had fled the massacres caused by the death of Ndadaye.185 The government ignored 
them under the pretext that ‘the repatriation program will be implemented by GTBE’. 
Humanitarian agencies also hesitated before giving them assistance. 
 
It is in the confusion surrounding implementation of the Accord that resulted in a tense 
political climate, marked by insecurity and vacuum of power that the extremists 
finalized the preparation of the genocide and massacres.186 It was necessary to 
exterminate all the natural or ideological allies of the RPF to eliminate the latter from 
the political scene in the times of elections.187 Furthermore, the violent war and 
genocide occurred because those in power did not manage to resolve the problem of 
ethnic differences and did not assure Rwandans of social cohesion. Those in the post-
colonial government got there through exclusion. Moreover, despite having a large 
presence of refugees who had fled in the neighbouring countries, those in power did not 
attempt to bring them back and instead labelled them as enemies who were a threat 
waiting to attack the state and outsiders who needed to be pushed out. Having not 
prioritized the question of politicized identities as part of the Arusha peace agenda, the 
political settlement and peace agreements remained very fragile throughout the 
process. Thus the early 1993s period that eventually ended Habyarimana’s rule was 
charactered by conversations to mobilize around hate, and fear of the other (the Tutsi, 
the foreign) that brought elites and ordinary Hutus together in a single act of the 
Genocide. Of course it is important to note that this was with the exception of the 
minority but notable Hutus who opposed the genocide ideology and even protected the 
Tutsis who would eventually form a new post-genocide identity of ‘survivors’.  
 
The failed attempts at a settlement in the early 1990s invariably culminated in the 
genocide. It was a settlement that focused largely on the elite and key protagonists and 
their interests.  The conversation on identity and the resulting contestations had 
brought the Rwandan state to the brink of collapse. The immediate settlement was 
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achieved through RUF victory on the battlefield. It now remains to be seen, what 
conversations have been central to the rebuilding of stable peace and of the Rwanda 




PART III: Post-settlement and Post-genocide Rwanda 
On 4th July 1994 RPF took control of Kigali and by 18th July had taken the entire country 
and chased the remnants of Rwanda’s government into neighbouring Zaire. The 
genocide had killed an estimated 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu’s. Rwanda was a 
nation of ashes. The social fabric had been ripped apart. The unimaginable horror of the 
genocide (which had occurred village by village, with neighbour on neighbour, using 
mostly machetes) had been the perverted logical conclusion of the racialised winner-
takes-all identity formation, which had appeared with the colonials and then fermented 
and grown in the independence era.  
 
The Rwanda re-born from the carnage of genocide sees multiple sites of conversation, 
which seek to move identify on from the ethnic dichotomy, which had dominated the 
last hundred years. Below is a discussion of those conversable spaces, with explanations 
of how Rwandan state-building has dealt with the military, power-sharing, identity and 
gender issues, which has also shaped other eras, whilst dealing with the complexity of 
delivering justice in a post-genocide context. Whilst conversations are, indeed, taking 
place, they occur within prescribed sets of rules and remain carefully managed by the 
incumbent (RPF) elite.  
There are elements of performance, choreography and management of certain events 
and spaces. Certain members of the community (local leaders) are for instance allowed 
to speak and criticise, but in a way that reinforces certain narratives or themes such as 
economic development and women’s participation. Thorny and divisive issues that 
criticise the upper echelons of the Rwanda elites and RPF narratives are often avoided 
or confined to the non-public informal realm or spaces outside of Rwanda. These 
conversations include political prisoners, ‘new identities’, media freedoms, historical 
accounts on the trigger of the genocide, reprisal attacks of FDLR, and controversial 
killings of RPF dissidents.  
 
Negotiation: creating a broad-based government 
The victorious RPF did not have a clear blue print of how they wanted to move forward 
after the genocide, or of the precise institutions and governance structures that needed 
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to be put in place. But its leaders did know that the process of post-genocide state 
building had to be participatory, and seen as participatory by a populace who had borne 
a huge brunt of the conflict. One key question guided RPF thinking during this time, 
which needed to be tackled in order for a blue print to materialise: What was the cause 
of dis-unity among the Rwandan people? In July 1994 during RPFs early discussions and 
negotiations with different groups in Rwanda, the RPF leadership felt they were the 
only ones with a clear ideology of how to solve Rwanda’s problems. While the blue print 
was not there, the ideology of participatory national unity and desire to solve that core 
question set them apart from other actors.188  
 
A national dialogue was initiated, convened at weekends, where leaders met with 
people and stakeholders to discuss this central question and issues of national unity; 
governance; security; and justice. This dialogue lasted for approximately one year.189 
Early on in the state building process, during its nation-wide tours the RPF was told that 
‘you people from Kigali’ have been the same through different era’s. Central government 
was seen as never delivering on promises made to the local population or involving 
them in national processes. RPF intended to change that perception.190 The appearance 
of ‘national dialogue’ has remained a key feature of Rwanda’s subsequent state building 
project, with citizen participation occurring within an RPF sanctioned environment 
remaining crucial components of such dialogues. As recalled by Senator Tito 
Rutaremara:  
 
“we realized not everybody thought the same way as us, so after defeating 
the government the first thing was to bring the political parties together. For 
unity to happen, allocation needed to be done equally so we made a broad 
based government based on power sharing in the transitional government 
[….] within the transitional government making decisions was difficult. It 
required a longer process as we needed to bargain, tolerate difference of 
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opinion, we had to listen to others. But it was worth doing as the eventual 
decision you take is better.”191 
 
To legitimise its victory and subsequent state building agenda, the RPF made use of 
three key documents which would guide the transitional arrangement and post-
genocide Rwanda: the constitution of 10th June 1991, the RPF declaration of 17th July 
1994 and the Arusha Peace Accord together with all its protocols. There was also the 
agreement between political parties made in November 1994 before the Transitional 
National Assembly was set up. The Arusha Peace Accord constituted a major source of 
inspiration for government action, as it integrated what RPF perceived as two essential 
principles in the management of the state: the establishment of the rule of law and the 
power-sharing arrangement. Modifications to the Arusha Peace Accord were made in 
the RPF declarations of 17th July 1994, which dealt with the challenging post-genocide 
context whilst ensuring RPF would be at the forefront of the burgeoning process. The 
Transitional Government which was set up remained inclusive and participatory, but 
with RPF remaining in a dominant position.  
 
The post of President of the Republic and the ministerial posts that belonged to the 
parties involved in the killings were awarded to the RPF. The powers of the President of 
the Republic were re-enforced: he could approve or change the Government, replace the 
Prime Minister and decide on issues on which a consensus within the Cabinet could not 
be reached (this was unlike the Arusha Accords which sought to reduce the power of 
the President). The Executive Branch would include the Presidency and the Cabinet, 
which would decide by consensus, as per the Arusha Accords. If consensus could not be 
reached, approval by 2/3 of the members of the Cabinet was required to pass a decision 
(with the President deciding if 2/3 could not be reached). The position of Vice-President 
was created, which would be held by RPF. The armed forces were to be formed 
regardless of ethnicity, sex, religion, etc. The transition would last 5 years.192  
 
Former combatants (ex-FAR) were, according to Protocol III of the Arusha Accord 
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integrated into the new armed forces (RPA)193 Any participation in the transitional 
arrangement was similarly dependent on not having a sectarian ideology of being a 
genocide perpetrator. On July 19 and November 25, 1994 respectively, the Government 
of National Unity and the Transitional Parliament were put in place. These were mainly 
made up of ministers and MPs from the RPF and seven other political parties (MDR, 
PSD, PL, PDC, UDPR, PSR, PDI) as well as the Civil Society. Key priorities were quickly 
identified for building Rwanda from the ashes of genocide: restoration of peace and 
security; organization of central and local administration; Restoration and consolidation 
of national unity; settlement of refugees and returning their property; Improvement of 
living conditions of the people and solving the social problems that resulted from war 
and genocide; Revival of the country’s economy; redefinition of the foreign policy; 
Consolidation of democracy.194  
Military Integration 
The role of Rwanda’s military in society remained crucial to the post-genocide state 
building process.195 As per Rwanda’s pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods, 
the army’s role in both protecting its citizens from external threats and its domestic 
function in state-society relations helps determine the nature of societal development 
unfurling. These were both immediately obvious in the post-genocide context, with 
external security threats from the Congo and pressing need to integrate the military at 
home key priorities.     
 
As soon as the new Government was inaugurated, security was the major concern. The 
ex-FAR and Interahamwe had re-organized themselves in the refugee camps in Burundi, 
Tanzania and especially Zaire. A flood of refugees into Eastern Congo had occurred as 
RPF approached Kigali (many fearing RPF reprisals) and giant refugee camps had been 
set up. These were infiltrated by militia and Interahamwe génocidaires who continued 
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to attack Rwanda. With the international community unwilling or unable to flush out 
these militia, RPF felt obliged to violently intervene in the refugee camps.196 Senator 
Tito again recalls: 
 
“The country invested in security. We asked the international community to 
separate the militias from the refugees in Congo, but they didn’t so we had to go 
there ourselves. After that the country was secure.” 197 
 
The continued chaos in Eastern-Congo eventually led to Rwanda’s (and Uganda’s) 1996 
to 1997 invasion of the country in order to dissolve the refugee camps (which was 
achieved with impressive speed). The subsequent 1998 to 2003 invasion was due to the 
newly installed President Kabilla enacting undesired anti-Rwanda policies. These two 
‘Congo Wars’ saw over 5 million dead until official withdrawal occurred in 2003. The 
FDLR, which Interahamwe remnants morphed into, have been a constant concern to 
Rwandan authorities and provoked continual interference in the now DRC.198 
 
Domestically, the RPF needed to set up an army and police force that was seen as a 
protector of society. Inclusivity was again required. The principle of the formation of a 
national army was adopted - the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) - in line with the 
Arusha Accords. The RPF restructured the High Command of the Army and the 
Gendarmerie, by integrating ex-FAR soldiers who were not involved in the genocide. By 
the end of 1997, 10,500 ex-FAR officers had been integrated into the RPA and by 2002 
39,200 of ex-FAR and militia had been integrated.199 During the reintegration ceremony 
of the returning servicemen into the RPA, the Vice-president and Minister of Defense 
stressed the fact that welcoming them into the new National Army did not exonerate 
those who might have committed crimes.200  
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Organization of central and local administration 
The need to mobilize more Rwandans around the ideas of the RPF was a major concern 
for its leadership, especially after 1998. A 1997 report by the Commission for political 
education and mass mobilization (PMM) had emphasised the need for civic education, 
with the objective of “changing the mentality of Rwandans, and explaining to them their 
problems and the need to seek solutions together.”201 The RPF was aware that its vision 
of society required fundamental change to the understanding, attitudes and conduct of 
the Rwandans. Once formed, the Government had to confront the administrative 
vacuum caused by war and the genocide. The pre-genocide framework was maintained, 
i.e. central government, provinces (prefectures), districts (communes), sectors and cells 
(at least in part due to the fact there was no time to reconsider whether a more 
appropriate administrative model was needed).202 Senior state officials were recruited 
(fairly easily), and there was then a ‘call to the regions’ led by officials among RPF 
cadres. It was important that this mobilization of lower-level officials was not to be 
biased and seen to involve all Rwandans.203 The contents of the mobilization messages 
had to focus on: politics, security, economy, social welfare. This sought to begin the 
process of building a ‘Rwandan’ identity that was beyond Hutu-Tutsi, which requires 
having and displaying a set of core values, and to give dignity to citizens by centralising 
their role in developing the country.204  
 
These ostensibly inclusive dialogues around nation building and the need for a new 
Rwandan identity (devoid of the racialized ethnicity from previous eras), has remained 
a hallmark of post-genocide Rwanda, from the immediate aftermath of 1994 to the 
present day. Various spaces have been created by the post-genocide government for 
dialogue across all sectors of society for ordinary people, the elites and others to discuss 
the pressing issues as part of national conversations. Amongst many others, Presidential 
visits (accompanied by his cabinet) occur where the President Kagame tours the 
country listening to ordinary people’s concerns and aspiration. The Unity club is a 
forum that brings together the political elite to discuss and dine together regularly. 
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There are youth camps that are organized for secondary school graduates as well as for 
journalists, artists, and entrepreneurs to discuss and learn about Rwanda’s history and 
patriotism. The Forum for Political Parties brings different political parties together to 
discuss legislation before it is presented to parliament. The annual National Dialogue 
brings together Rwandans from the Diaspora, ordinary Rwandans, representatives from 
all political parties, leaders, diplomats, and aid partners, convening them at parliament 
for an annual conversation on the status of the country. There are also camps for former 
FDLR rebels returning to Rwanda, to educate them on the new Rwanda and Rwandan 
national identity.  
 
These spaces are carefully managed, however, to allow the dominant and desired state- 
building narratives to come to the fore. The Presidential tour, for example, sees an 
almost crafted way for citizens to engage. A chosen presenter will thank the President 
for delivering development or security, and give an example of some achievement they 
have enjoyed (inline with government push to promote entrepreneurship, women and 
youth achievements. Or, during National Dialogue forums individuals from within or 
outside parliament are allowed to ask questions using open phone lines, Twitter, 
Facebook. There are rarely questions that come especially from the social media that for 
example engages the issues of political leadership and other controversial emerging 
issues. Yet the questions of identity and refugees are discussed openly. Nevertheless, 
surveys indicate that citizens have high level of confidence in their leaders. 205    
Settlement of refugees  
The settlement of refugees, like many features of the immediate post-genocide 
landscape, contained practical challenges, ideological aspirations, and unintended 
consequences regarding identity formation in Rwanda. There was a massive return of 
refugees from neighbouring countries, who had followed behind RPFs steady military 
progress throughout the war and now enjoyed national government blessing for their 
right to reside in Rwanda. The RPF sought policies and efforts to repatriate all refugees, 
with an ideological belief that no Rwandan should be forced to stay outside the country 
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against their will.206 This posed an immediate and acute problem, as arrangements for 
their resettlement had not been made and were now going against the humanitarian 
and donor preferences. Returning refugees settled in properties and houses of those 
who had recently fled the country. The new government was very aware that illegal 
occupations were prevalent and problematic. Meanwhile anti-government propaganda 
amongst the feeling refugees led to a reluctance for them to return home; preventing 
genuine forgiveness and reconciliation from occurring and fuelling propaganda efforts 
claiming the new RPF government was hostile to Hutus. 
 
The new Government developed an urgent program for constructing houses for 
returning refugees through a hire-purchase system by calling for external aid.207 It also 
wanted to assign plots in the city to those who had the ability to build houses. The 
Ministry of the Interior appointed a committee to study the issue. In the meantime, 
while waiting for its conclusions, the RPF leadership decided that documents giving 
property back to their owners should not be issued by the Ministry normally in charge, 
but by the grassroots leaders. In 1997, many families had no home, no water and 
electricity. A special Committee within RPF in charge of assessing the issue of land 
ownership and land use proposed adopting the solution of grouped villages 
(imidugudu),208 which was experimented in Kibungo Prefecture, even though it still had 
some imperfections.209 
 
The refugee status of Rwandans forms an important part of their post-genocide identity. 
As part of pursuing justice, RPF efforts to classify the different refugees (or non-
refugees) have created supposedly non-ethnic identities that are nonetheless (conscious 
or sub-consciously) associated with particular groups and experiences. Zorbas states 
that ‘returnees’ are Tutsi RPF; ‘old refugees’ are Tutsi’s who left Rwanda pre-1990s; 
‘new refugees’ are returning Hutu’s who fled to Congo post-genocide; ‘victims’ are Tutsi; 
‘perpetrators’ are Hutu.210 Hintjens also discusses these categories as (1) survivors; (2) 
old caseload returnees; (3) new caseload returnees; (4) suspected genocidaires, and 
shows how the pursuit of justice and this labelling can exclude certain Rwandans - a 
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62 
 
child of Hutu-Tutsi marriage, for example, whose parents were both killed but whose 
Uncle is pursued as a Killer.211 There appears a degree of resentment that only Tutsi 
victims are remembered. And there is certainly degrees of animosity that Hutu’s are 
never seen as victims within the justice-reconciliation discourse – either as victims of 
RPF atrocities, victims of the genocide killings, or suffering/death experienced in the 
refugee camps post-genocide.  
Gacaca  
Delivery of justice – for the victims of genocide and against the perpetrators - stood out 
as a key conversation in the post-genocide period. Acts of revenge, extra-judicial 
executions, illegal detentions and disappearances, had also almost inevitably occurred 
after the cessation of hostilities. Gacaca courts have become one of the most well known 
features of post-genocide Rwanda, often celebrated as an Africa-born transitional 
justice mechanism. They were born, however, from practical necessity as much as any 
desire to utilise traditional processes.  Faced with rapidly over-crowding of prisons 
throughout the country, rather than propose a moratorium on the arrests of suspects 
the government at first attempted to enlarge the correctional establishments (of Rilima, 
Ntsinda, Kimironko and Gikondo).  
To accelerate the processing of the cases, sorting commissions (commissions de triage) 
were created but were afterwards replaced by mobile groups (groups mobiles). The 
latter processed 23,418 cases, releasing 4,106 prisoners, but still did not fulfil to 
expectations of timely delivery of justice.212 In September 1996, the Rwandan 
government promulgated a law on genocide to allow the prosecution of those who were 
presumed guilty.213 The law were provided four categories of responsibilities,214 with 
advantages granted to those who would confess their guilt, but again did not produce 
the desired effects. This led to the creation of Gacaca courts in June 2002. Rutaremara 
clarifies why Gacaca courts were created:  
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“The state chose Gacaca for two main reasons. So many perpetrators had 
committed crimes hence punishing them would have been politically and 
socially unmanageable due to their numbers. We also realized many 
perpetrators had killed before in the 1960s, 70s, and before the genocide. 
Choosing the European model would have taken a long time. Hence they 
settled on Gacaca. The philosophy of Gacaca is not to punish but rather to 
integrate the person into society. The Gacaca idea first emerged in 1995, but 
it took 5 years before it was implemented because people had been 
corrupted by the idea of western justice having to be followed.”215 
The objectives of the Gacaca Courts were as follows: identify the truth about what 
happened during the genocide; speed up genocide trials; fight against the culture of 
impunity; contribute to national unity and the reconciliation process; and demonstrate 
the capacity of the Rwandan people to resolve their own problems.216 By the beginning 
of 2003 there were concerns around the following issues: the declining interest of the 
population; some judges elected to try suspects were also accused of committing 
genocide; there were cases where, for fear of being denounced and arrested, some 
people preferred to flee the country; some judges were illiterate; many meetings were 
boycotted for unidentified reasons; security and safety of witnesses or accused people 
who feared for their life; tendency of the court to systematically exonerate presumed 
suspects especially by families of the detained; some judges were demanding salary; 
there were families whose members were killed by RPF soldiers and the former wished 
that the latter be judged; and some complementary legal tools on the law establishing 
Gacaca courts had not yet been passed. 217 
A Presidential decree of January 2003 developed the Gacaca process further. It required 
that in all qualified instances to free people who had admitted their crimes albeit, under 
some conditions. Other people who were to be set free included: those above 70 years, 
the sick and the minors at the time of committing crimes. More than 40,000 people 
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would be handled under this clause, and according to the Ministry of Justice  21,410 
people were set free in February 2003.  
Gacaca courts were central in identifying the planners and organizers of the genocide, 
and were effective in identifying those involved in distribution of weapons as well as 
those who gave orders to set up roadblocks. Much of this information was already 
known and available to authorities, however, and so the Gacaca process of encouraging 
voluntary confessions is perhaps the more important feature. As of 2012, the total 
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Although the Gacaca courts have dealt with some of the post-genocide justice challenges 
faced by Rwanda, their key role has been the local ownership and inclusiveness of the 
process. It sought the opportunity to bring perpetrators and victims together in building 
the post-genocide state.218 Nonetheless, despite apparent quantitative and qualitative 
progress, the Gacaca Courts have encountered major challenges:  
 
                                                 




1) 46,000 Inyangamugayo judges representing 27,1%, have been accused of 
genocide and dismissed from Gacaca Courts;  
2) Leaders, especially those in the local government who were accused of 
participating in genocide, constituted a serious obstacle to the smooth running of 
Gacaca Courts;  
3) Conspiracy of providing information on genocide (CECEKA) has occurred, 
especially in regions where none survived or with a small number of survivors; 
4) Destruction of Gacaca Courts proceedings materials, especially activities and 
data collection notebooks, has occurred;  
5) Violence of many kind against genocide Survivors, witnesses and Gacaca Courts 
Inyangamugayo Judges, which has sometimes resulted in murder;  
6) Strong trauma manifested during Gacaca Courts proceedings; 
7) Confessing other’s crimes with the intention of covering the involvement of 
intellectuals and wealthy people; 
8) Relocating of some citizens who participated in genocide to places where they 
are not known;  
9) Fleeing of some citizens pretending that they are threatened by Gacaca while 
they running from their involvement in Genocide; 
10) Corruption and favoritism in decision-making. 
 
Restoration of National Unity 
The restoration of national unity was ideally supposed to provide relief from sorrow 
and guilt, to pave the way for true reconciliation over time. According to the Verdeja 
definition,219 the reconciliation process involved in such a context relies on an 
interpersonal perspective in which access to the truth leads those guilty of the crimes to 
make genuine repentance and the victims to grant forgiveness. This is the only way that 
can eventually lead both groups to mutual healing from the trauma caused by the 
genocide.  Rwandans generally give a relational aspect to reconciliation and understand 
it as the ‘building of good relationships’, which involves the fact of ‘asking for forgiveness’ 
and ‘forgiving.’220 Gacaca was something of a Truth and Punishment forum providing 
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comfort and revenge, with genuine reconciliation only achievable over a longer, perhaps 
even generational, period once that necessary process had occurred. 
 
Reconciliation is also attempted through particular projects which bring together 
victims and perpetrators, such as housing construction projects which one week sees 
both build a dwelling for a survivor together, and then next week build something for a 
perpetrator’s family. The major instrument of achieving the policy of reconciliation and 
restoration of national unity was the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 
(NURC), created in March 1999. The program of the NURC fitted with the agenda of the 
Transitional Government.221 It established constant contact with the population who 
informed it on the causes of division and the calamities that had characterized the 
recent history of Rwanda. NURC sought to identify and analyse the failures of regimes, 
which denied and destroyed national unity and the consequences that followed. Lastly, 
it sought to present and explain a new political direction regarding national unity and 
reconciliation.222  
 
The long trips conducted by the Commission across the country helped to explain the 
importance of justice to the population. The Commission helped the courts to engage 
the Rwandan people in dialogue on various issues of genocide. The Commission was 
also charged with the task of organizing solidarity camps (Ingando) for various 
categories of people and the public.223 These included: the youth who were preparing to 
join higher institutions of learning, soldiers who were preparing to return to civilian life, 
former soldiers of the Rwandan Armed Forces and Interahamwe militia who wished to 
be reintegrated to the new national army and return to civilian life, officials in charge of 
local and national administrative posts, teachers, etc. The commission was charged with 
organizing periodic meetings between the Rwandan Diaspora and the Rwandese within 
the country. NURC also was finally tasked with organizing international consultancies, 
conferences and debates and to conduct research on various thematic areas.224 
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The commission has an upper hand in the annual commemoration of the national 
mourning event. It oversees the search for and dignified burial of the remains of 
genocide victims. It inaugurates genocide sites and establishes contacts with survivors. 
The annual reports of the commission provide data on the current debate on the 
reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi. To illustrate, the 2015 NURC Barometer stressed 
that the majority of Rwandans (83.4%) think that reconciliation in Rwanda is (or should 
be) between genocide criminals/perpetrators and genocide survivors. As the below figure 
shows, only 43.7% of Rwandans think that reconciliation is (or needs to be) between 
Rwandans and their history.  
 
Figure 1Parties to reconciliation in Rwanda225 
 
NURC also establishes contact between various members of the Rwandan population 
and foreign partners.226  
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Many Rwandese were of the view that corruption was rampant especially in the Justice 
department.227 Instances where corruption was noted included: corrupt magistrates 
who were corrupted by suspected criminals or their family members in order to favour 
them in their judgment; falsification of files by the judicial staff and prison wardens; 
deliberate disappearance of files by the judicial personnel leading the defendants of 
many suspects without files to be set free; granting prisoners permission to exit jail 
which were abused, especially those suspected of genocide crimes (prison staff gave 
permission to prisoners to work, enjoy family visits and get married); setting prisoners 
free as a result of political, administrative and military interventions; threatening some 
people with imprisonment charges of genocide by the magistrate and prison staff in 
order to extort money; irregularities in the sale of goods and property belonging to  
people who were absent, in prison or young survivors; illegal imprisonment declared on 
rich or affluent people.  
Gender 
RPF had considered the role of women in the movement since its inception as an armed 
refugee group in 1989/1990. Its leaders studied other liberation movements and 
determined that women had to be part of whatever nation-building project would 
eventually be undertaken in Rwanda. This decision was not always popular, and proved 
a particularly contentious issue when other people and groups were engaged following 
the RPF victory. Senator Tito recalls that, in fact, this was one of the most difficult issues 
for RPF to convince others on, at that time. RPF encouraged women to form associations 
and fight for their issues, and created political schools for women.228  Since women and 
youth constituted the majority of Rwanda’s population, the Transitional Government 
deemed it fit to include them in national programs.229 The state encouraged women to 
get involved in decision-making instances, starting from the first electoral campaigns of 
1999, 2001 and 2003. For example, during the 2001 elections organized by district and 
sector committees, almost 25% of the women were elected.230 
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The Rwandan Constitution of 2003 stipulates that women shall occupy at least 30% of 
the decision-making organs in the country. Following the 2003 Rwanda has had the 
highest percentage of women in its National Assembly in the world - 48.8% in the 
Chamber of Deputies; 30% in the Senate.231 Women also occupied 37% in Executive 
organs and 41% in the Supreme Court.232 Women occupied various leadership positions 
and intellectual responsibilities. Some old customs and stereotypes were overturned 
when women started constructing houses, doing hard and challenging tasks, etc. They 
also contributed significantly to the peace and reconciliation already discussed.233 
 
Rwanda has received extremely positive acclaim for the gender dimension of the post-
genocide era, with President Kagame receiving various accolades as a result. Genuine 
equality is yet to be achieved, however. Achievement in primary education, for example, 
is not matched in secondary and higher education. Employment distribution is also 
skewed in favour of men, and women’s entrepreneurial skills still lacking.234 Burnet 
suggests there is actually a paradox of more women being present but that they lack 
genuine power.235 She argues that people at the grassroots never really understood the 
idea of Women’s Councils in 1998 and the process was driven by elite women; and also 
that the women’s movement has lost some momentum due to many of its leaders now 
becoming incorporated into state politics rather than leading civil society ventures.236 
Burnet is positive, however, that in the long term the presence of women will have an 
extremely positive effect. Burnet also praises Rwandan women for skilfully operating 
within whatever political system they have been faced with, recognising 
authoritarianism but making gains within it. This began under Habyarimana where 
Women’s civil society groups did operate and effect some policies, and the same now 
occurs under Kagame.237 
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International actors had, of course, played a crucial role in the shaping of Rwandan 
identity, especially in the formation of the Hutu-Tutsi ethnic distinction that proved so 
problematic. Perceiving who were the rightful citizens of Rwanda and who was the 
‘foreign’ invader clearly played a role in the genocide. Institutionally, Rwanda has 
adopted a unique model of representative government. It supposedly seeks to ensure no 
single party monopolises power. Measures such as no party ever having the Presidency 
and Speaker of Parliament position no matter how dominant their electoral support is, 
for example, is held up as illustrating this more broad-based approach.238 Similarly, the 
fact that a party cannot hold more than 50% of the cabinet positions even if it has won 
elections by massive landslide is cited as one of the checks on abuse of power.  
Whether the reality of power distribution in Rwanda conforms to these stated goals is 
certainly questioned by the international community. The decision that President 
Kagame will stay for a Third Term in 2016 (following a national referendum which 
voted in favour of changing the constitution to allow that to occur), was met with 
concern from the US and UK who have provided much donor aid to Rwanda following 
RPF’s victory (although viewed differently by the EU. The majority of Kagame critics 
often highlight human rights issues such as restricted press freedoms and opposition 
politicians unfairly targeted as illustrating the board-based government is perhaps not 
all it seems.239 The Proportional Representation system in use in Rwanda (to elect a 
certain number of parliamentarians) is seen by some as providing the illusion of 
democracy but is in fact used as it is easier to control and fake, allowing a token amount 
of opposition candidates in whilst maintaining RPF control.240 
With the state building project now seeking to dispel any notion of Hutu or Tutsi being 
seen as ‘the other’, Rwandan identity is now being framed somewhat as requiring a 
healthy mistrust of ‘foreigners’ instead. Western interests and agendas are viewed 
suspiciously. The international community has (rightly) been vilified for its lack of 
action in the genocide, and the RPF has quite skillfully played on Western shame to 
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maintain donor support even when undertaking activities they are more critical of 
(such as the Congo Wars).241 There is a strong feeling that Rwanda should have received 
compensation from international actors following the genocide, due to their disregard 
and inaction over the plight unfolding – these would be form of reparations, entirely 
different from the traditional (and tied) donor aid that has been forthcoming to some 
extent.242 Kagame now often criticises external interference, or foreigners’ lack of 
understanding of Rwanda. Rwandan post-genocide statebuilding sees an ‘activist 
regime’ promoting particular forms of knowledge about itself, and deliberately framing 
its context as something outsiders cannot understand.243 Just as pre-colonial Rwanda 
used conquest of foreign lands partly as a means of uniting a populace around a shared 
sense of national identity, so now the protection of the Rwandan project against foreign 
interference is being utilized to create the new Rwandan identity. The state building 
project in Rwanda nonetheless continues to hold with all these issues at the centre of 
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What does Rwanda’s state-building conversation in its evolutions tell us about 
prospects for sustainable peace?  
 
The conversable spaces have evolved from pre-colonial to contemporary times. Some of 
the issues at the core of the conversation are no longer central and some spaces have 
been transformed. But some issues have remained constant across the periods even if 
they have varied in content. And some conversable spaces have remained constant 
including, for example, education and schools, public administration and external 
spaces where refugees are located.  
Conversations about peacebuilding in Rwanda have centred on various state-building 
efforts aimed towards restoration of peace and security after the genocide. They 
include: management of land; organization of central and local administration, 
restoration and consolidation of national identity and unity; settlement of refugees and 
returning their property especially land and rebuilding their homes; development and 
improvement of living conditions of the people and solving the social problems that 
resulted from war and genocide; revival of the country’s economy; redefinition of the 
foreign policy; and consolidation of participatory democracy. Certain issues were given 
priority. These included power sharing, national dialogue, establishing a state and 
having a vision of where that should be.  
There are spaces that the post-genocide government has created for conversations 
across all sectors of society for ordinary people, the elites and others to discuss the 
pressing issues as part of national conversations. For Rwanda, the issues of identity, 
political leadership, the refugees are discussed openly as long as they adhere to certain 
rules set by the custodians of the system. Conversations are happening, and there are 
deliberate efforts by the ruling elite to create spaces where all stakeholders can hold the 
conversations. However, there is an unspoken view that the RPF political bureau 
carefully manages these spaces and the agenda that the conversation in a particular 
space should focus on depending on the circumstances. Thus only agreed themes, 
chosen participants from each groups, are allowed to participate and “converse back to 
power.” There are regular conversations, sometimes happening at the same time, at 
different spaces that are part of statebuilding. There is an interchange between the 
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ruled and the ruling following a certain script that allows a representative of particular 
group in society to fit their own narrative that directly corresponds to the national 
narrative, and that has and reinforced a particular outcome.  
There is an implicit acceptance of the following:  
 That these forums are “all inclusive” and visibly allow elites and ordinary 
Rwandans to converse and engage “openly” on issues that affect ordinary 
Rwandans.  
 That these forums have been institutionalized, legalized, legitimized in the eyes 
of the locals and the “western world” therefore caters to the needs of democracy, 
institutions building and state’s sovereignty.  
 The themes and solutions proposed in these forums tends to focus on what 
Rwandan is praised for, women issues, economic empowerment and les on those 
issues that some Rwandans and the non-Rwandans insist need to be discussed.  
 In these spaces, the military, the police and all other security agents that are in 
charge of implementing, maintaining and supervising “peace” are present. They 
tend to allow local leaders especially mayors to be in ‘trouble’ or questioned by 
the authorities visibly in public but the higher you go in political leaders, the less 
questions questioning the top elites or RPF as a party.  
 
Our interviews spoke to the above conversations and the importance of these spaces. 
However, there are also conversations that happen elsewhere that are not necessarily 
controlled and that sometimes find themselves in the “managed” forums. However, 
when they do appear, they are silenced deliberately or responded too within a 
particular way that discourages continued conversations. Within Rwanda, these 
conversations tend to happen in private, through a culture of whispering especially in 
social spaces such as bars, markets, homes, through religious groups and a rare attempt 
recently through music. We see them happening more freely in known spaces that were 
created and bring together the outside opposition parties or individuals, in bars in 
Belgium, England, US University campuses, online platforms and on Western streets 
when protests occur during Presidential visits or Rwandan Day is convened outside 
Rwanda.  Non-Rwandans or Rwandans in western institutions sometimes set the 
agenda, using platforms such as Human Rights Watch reports, academic journals, 
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documentaries, US state department press releases, BBC Kinyarwanda/Kirundi 
programs etc, which also influence these informal conversations.  
 
Even though these conversations rarely come together in one forum, they are 
sometimes parallel and participants listen to each other and respond through their 
various forums. They are intense and tend to focus on pre-genocide and post-genocide 
issues that remain thorny and divisive subjects on the present and imagined peaceful 
future. The controversial issues include:  
 
1. Political leadership: Recently: the issues of Kagame’s third term.  
2. The form of democracy to be practiced for example allowing parties to practice 
in the open outside the political forum.  
3. Political prisoners tried on other reasons. 
4. The question of journalists and freedom of the media.  
5. Historical accounts of what happened to Habyarimana’s plane and the trigger of 
the genocide.  
6. Identity: The issues surrounding the silence around the question of the Hutus or 
other Rwandans who were killed outside the Genocide (by the RPA in and 
outside of Rwanda during the 1990’s.) For example recently Kizito Mihigo who 
has been singing RPF and commemoration songs composed a song on 20th 
commemoration of the genocide that has this message - All deaths are equal and 
all should be remembered equally, even those killed in vengeance attacks.  
Before the song came out, he was charged in courts for discussing on WhatsApp 
and social media with the enemies in and outside Rwanda and wanting to kill 
government officials. He lost the case, the song was put on YouTube, 
conversations erupted everywhere (in Rwanda and outside, formally and 
informally) while he was settling in prison, joining Ingabire and others who have 
attempted to bring the two conversations together inside Rwanda and ended up 
in prison. 
7. The question of those in prison for questioning the RPF elites.   
8. The RPF genocide narrative and managing or manufacturing history that aligns 
with the victor’s interests.  
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9. The murders of former RPF ruling elites, or other controversial deaths in 
Rwanda and outside (such as the recent ‘accident’ of a well known Tutsi business 
man and pro RPF elite turned critic), the bodies discovered between Burundi and 
Rwanda flowing in rivers.   
10. The question of new (mostly former RPF followers), and old refugees (those who 
left in 1994 and are settled in Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Central Africa 
Republic, Kenya, Tanzania and Western capitals. Rwandan government has a 
position and made it clear to western countries and UNHCR that there should be 
no one accepted to be called refugees because there are spaces to engage and 
discuss issues and solutions being implemented and Rwanda is at peace. 
11. The question of definitions of concepts/terminology for language use: Human 
Rights, Survivors, the Rwanda Genocide or the Genocide Against the Tutsi, 
Genocide denialism etc.  
12. There are also discussions on new identities crafted by ordinary people informed 
by their post-genocide life experiences. For example, abasajya – those who came 
from Uganda, abajepe-those who came from Burundi, abasope-those who were 
in Rwanda, abareskape-survivors (usually meaning Tutsis), abadubai-those who 
came from Congo. These are identities that people organize around, and that can 
sometimes determine access to economic development and privilege in society. 
It also determines particular behavior when conversations are being held.  
 
Within this statebuilding project, the role of the army in the old and newly erected 
warrior nation is key to the understanding of new Rwandaness. The economic success 
of modern Rwanda has become part of the new narrative of Rwandan Nation-rebuilding 
and state-building. The military position in society almost inevitably creates a limited 
and restricted sense of identity, nationhood, and Rwandaness in the short term – the 
horror endured means the risks of backsliding is perhaps too great at present to allow 
completely honest and open dialogue to be presented in public. As noted by Musoni 
Protais: 
 “... it is perhaps not the purest democracy at the moment, but it is what 
Rwandans want at this time. It could have been disastrous if he [Kagame] 
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was allowed to leave at this time, it risks undoing the positive steps we have 
taken.”244  
The strength of the army as a core around which the new Rwandaness emerges is likely 
to adapt over time, as political learning occurs and younger generations growing up in 
‘peace’ are more confident of their position in society and the stability of the society 
itself. Processes and institutions are in place, which although currently worthy of 
critique, now require time for their potential true benefits to emerge. Indeed, only time 
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